The Last Word expressed by Capt. Nico Voorbach
more that the decisions to operate are no longer left to pilots but are directed by political sensitivities. Aviation regulatory authorities took away the possibility for pilots and airlines to make decisions regarding safety, disregarding the fact that they are prepared and trained to handle such situations. We often say that the air transport industry is the most regulated deregulated field; this is not only true from a safety and commercial point of view but also from a security one. Attacks and attempted attacks such as Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, 9/11, Richard Reid (the ‘Shoe Bomber’), the liquid plot in the UK and NW 253 on Christmas Day 2009, have been the source of new regulations based on emergency responses.
T Every
incident has demonstrated a number of failures in the security chain that led to the success of a terrorist attack. Unfortunately, emergency responses solely focus on the last failure in the chain which is very often the least important one. Consequently, the bunch of new regulations aimed at improving air transport security also focus on a particular aspect of the terrorist attack. Such an approach is not efficient in practice as it obliges airports and airlines to acquire new security equipment, increasing the financial burden on the air transport industry and making it less competitive. From a political point of view, very few voices are heard addressing the real problems such as the lack of effective communication between national intelligence agencies.
All this new legislation may be justified
but it is mostly designed in such a way that security measures are easily
48 A Personal View
“
...the current security chain is getting weaker and weaker. It is like trying to add new floors to the leaning tower of Pisa...”
he closing of European airspace on Thursday 15th April 2010, due to a volcanic ash cloud, showed once
inspected or audited. Yet, they are often too rigid and not adapted to operational reality. This takes away the possibility for specialists to assess the effectiveness of the measures. As discussed several times in this journal, these new measures are usually just added to the old ones. Instead of looking at the whole security chain and trying to rethink it in a most integrated and efficient way, new layers are just added on top of the others, reducing the overall efficiency of the security system. One example is that everybody who flies aboard an aircraft is screened in the same way (in Europe) whether they are tourists, terrorists, deportees or flight crew. Such measures are never questioned. Why is that? Are we afraid to miss anyone who could pose a threat or are we simply happy to see that all measures are implemented everywhere in the same way? Flight crew are treated like any passenger - or even sometimes as potential terrorists - at the screening point, but once onboard they are the security keepers. There is a kind of paradox in not trusting the pilots before they enter the aircraft and then handing them the controls! Screening measures would be more efficient if they spent more time on people presenting a suspect profile.
Another example is that, since September 2001 we, as pilots, are no longer allowed to bring anyone in the cockpit during flight. We understand this measure is based on a potential threat but we are also regret not to be able to give some pleasure to the kids who, in the past, could discover a cockpit and have an unforgettable experience. Why is this no longer ‘legal’? Is a kid a threat to aviation security? Is he or she a potential 9/11- style terrorist?
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Looking at the numerous ‘legislative layers’ it seems that the current security chain is getting weaker and weaker. It is like trying to add new floors to the leaning tower of Pisa. There is no cohesion and it only makes the edifice weaker, until it will collapse. Perhaps the legislators should be ready to review and redesign the whole security process? This revision should not be politically driven but based on consultation with security experts. Such experts should consider a more efficient process not only in terms of security but also in terms of passenger flow. Security measures have to be rational in
order to be understood by passengers. It is important to create awareness among the passengers and train them to respond in case of a security incident. It is also very important to have reliable, professional and trusted screeners. They need to be aware of the threats, to be motivated by the position and to be recognised as an important link in the chain. What actually happens is that most of the screeners are outsourced and underpaid. Because of this most screeners don’t stay in the job long. It is very difficult to trust a former employee that has not felt respected in his position and to expect that s/he will preserve the confidentiality required for the job. This weakens the security chain, as these people are aware of the screening measures put in place by the airports and airlines; such information has a high value to terrorists. Just like a pilot has to make decisions sometimes beyond the procedures manual, we need people in aviation security who are inventive and who can deal with events not contained in the rulebook.
Nico Voorbach is Chairman Security Committee, Dutch Air Lines Pilots Association & IFALPA Security Representative to ICAO, The Netherlands
June 2010 Aviationsecurityinternational
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