Volcanoes & Flotillas: from Eyjafjallajökull to Gaza
by Philip Baum A
s we pat down bodies, X-ray bags, verify identification, effect random vehicle searches and swab a variety of hand-held items that might just have come into contact with explosives, we believe that we are doing all that we can to prevent the next terrorist atrocity taking place. Laudable efforts, implemented by underpaid individuals in one of the most bureaucratic of labour environments. Most of us willingly accept these checks as a necessary evil, going through the motions of divesting our shoes and belts at checkpoints, disposing our liquid purchases into huge bins, standing patiently in line after line and handing over our papers umpteen times for any single journey. And so we should. Predicting the modus operandi of the next terrorist attack is no easy task and a lack of evidence makes airlines and airports reluctant to embrace fresh procedures and technologies designed to be proactive. As such, there is little to prevent a chemical, biological or radiological attack. There have been a number of events
recently that have demonstrated the impact of being ill prepared. The eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland, which paralysed the European aviation industry for a week in April, not only showed us the force of Mother Nature, but also the need to plan for the unpredictable. There has been significant reporting of the fact that Eyjafjallajökull is actually the small volcano and that its far more powerful sister, Katla, has a habit of erupting within a year of Eyjafjallajökull. It could well be that the skies of Europe will have to close yet again and, perhaps, for even longer next time around. Rather than simply accepting the
closure, senior management should now be planning how it will use the time constructively. We always complain about a lack of training time and rarely are full- scale security exercises conducted due to
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the 24/7 nature of normal airport life. It would be scandalous to simply pay staff to sit around and twiddle their thumbs when an opportunity to enhance both frontline and management capability is afforded us.
In terms of volcanic activity, there is little point commencing the planning once the eruption has taken place. Now is the time for the contingency plans to be drafted; plans that not only address managing safety and security, but also how to best occupy manpower. An airport is not like a school that gets closed down due to heavy snow and whose children can enjoy the special treat of a snow day to go and play.
“...Katla has a habit of erupting within a year of Eyjafjallajökull...”
The Israeli raid on the flotilla making its
way towards Gaza on 31st May, and the subsequent deaths of nine persons on board, also demonstrated just how critical it is to have the correct intelligence and the price one pays if one gets it wrong. Here was one of the world’s elite commando forces, carrying out a mission carrying a heavy price tag – a damned if you do and damned if you don’t operation. They couldn’t risk allowing the flotilla to reach Gazan shores uninspected, the ramifications of which could have been disastrous, yet any intervention, especially in international waters, was going to engender worldwide condemnation. The comparison with our aviation security process is clear. The vast majority of passengers boarding airliners are law abiding citizens who mean no harm and who simply want to travel as quickly as possible from the point of departure to their desired destination. Sure there are a few who make life difficult for themselves, and for others, by having a few drinks too
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many at the bar before their flight or who are naturally objectionable individuals who like to challenge authority. But, the number of genuinely threatening passengers is very small. Because of them, however, we all submit ourselves to scrutiny.
The same applies to demonstrators. The vast majority have worthy goals and commendable desires. In the case of the May flotilla, most passengers on the ships, wanted to see humanitarian aid brought into Gaza. A few of them were making the journey as it was the trendy thing to do, probably ignorant of the potential for the flotilla to be used for more nefarious purposes. But, amongst their number, were some hardliners, prepared to resist the ships being inspected at all costs. The raid itself was deemed to be a
failure both in terms of the execution of the exercise – dropping in soldiers one- by-one into a savage crowd of people who were far from being peaceful activists on a humanitarian mission – and as a PR exercise. Israel, within hours, was being vilified around the world.
Much of the criticism was justified and the Israeli public was also expressing its dismay, with serious questions being asked of the military and Defence Minister Ehud Barak as to why and how they so misjudged the resistance they would encounter. Yet, counter-terrorism is not for the faint-hearted. Hamas, albeit the elected government in Gaza, is regarded as a terrorist organisation, one that refuses to recognise the existence of its neighbour and has sanctioned the launching of rockets into Israel. Whatever one thinks about the blockade, activists have to understand that it’s all very well being on some sort of moral crusade, but that demonstrating
in the comparative
safety of London’s Whitehall, Paris’ Champs Elysees, or outside the White House is a different ball game to sailing into a war zone with all its inherent risks.
June 2010 Aviationsecurityinternational
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