cases of force used to end police pur- suits, courts were infl uenced by factors such as threats to innocent bystanders, imminent danger to other motorists, and the need for split-second decision- making—factors that were not present in this case.
Notwithstanding favorable (to the
officer) decisions like Mullenix, law enforcement agencies must continue to weigh whether using deadly force to terminate high-speed pursuits is in the best interest of their agency and the public. In balancing the governmental need to end dangerous driving against the rights of individuals not to be un- reasonably killed, many agencies have decided on policy that prohibits shoot- ing at or from moving vehicles except when deadly force is authorized and the officer is trapped in a situation where that shooting is the only way to
defend him/herself against the immi- nent deadly threat.
Such policy-making is grounded in the belief that, when shooting at or from moving vehicles, the offi cer is more likely to hit an unintended target than the intended one—thereby increasing unintended dangers. This case illus- trates this concern: While purportedly attempting to shoot the vehicle and not the driver, the offi cer hits the driver’s upper body with four out of six rounds. One has to ask what or who the offi cer would have shot if he had been trying to hit the driver.
And even if it turns out that shooting
someone to stop dangerous vehicular fl ight is not constitutionally unreason- able, state-based tort law could still decide it to be unacceptable, as could a criminal prosecutor. In any event, this case doesn’t decide that this shooting
was constitutionally acceptable, it only recognizes that existing case law has not made deadly force plainly unconstitu- tional on facts specifi cally like these and that the offi cer is therefore immune from federal constitutional liability. One last thing: In federal constitu- tional litigation, the qualifi ed immunity defense is only available to individual defendants, not to entity defendants like the city or county and its law enforce- ment agencies. If a policy or custom (i.e., practice) of an entity defendant is a moving force in causing a constitutional rights violation, the entity defendant is strictly liable even if prior existing law was, as the Supreme Court describes it in this case, “hazy.”
LaO Post your comments on this story by visiting
www.lawandordermag.com
http://info.hotims.com/61784-8 www.lawandordermag.com 9
Hyatt Regency O’Hare | Rosemont, IL 262.767.1406 |
www.ileeta.org
Six days of instructor training for only $367!
150 companies featuring cutting-edge products & technology Over 150 courses and 24 certifications and armorer courses! Instructors from around the world
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68