FOCUS Grenfell progress
transparent and trusting relationship between those involved, which will help make other improvements and necessary changes going forward. Although the government is ultimately responsible for legislation regarding fire regulation and safety, the construction industry must be diligent and attentive to prevent future disaster. Everyone involved should be taking proactive responsibility for their actions relating to fire regulation.
What has changed?
Although Grenfell’s cladding had been compliant with BS 8414 testing alongside certain insulation types, its particular combination of ACM and insulation had not been tested14
.
After Grenfell and the recommendations set out in Dame Judith’s report, the government instructed the Building Research Establishment to complete a series of compliance tests. These were to be completed with the aim of gaining an improved understanding of the differing extents of combustibility for separate combinations of ACM and insulation and to gather data on how these compounds react during a fire15
.
Prior to Grenfell, Clause 12.7 of Approved Document B2 had stated that any ‘insulation product’ or ‘filler material’ on buildings above 18 metres should be of ‘limited combustibility’16
This clause clearly addressed the flammability of insulation materials used within cladding
systems; however, it did not directly indicate the inclusion of outer cladding material. The government later argued that the clause lacked this specificity, as the inclusion of cladding material was to be assumed. The installation of a flammable combination
on Grenfell Tower has highlighted that sections of the construction industry were either unaware of the advice or were confused by it, highlighting the prescriptive nature of pre Grenfell fire regulation that Dame Judith warns against. The government has since changed the wording of its advice to avoid further miscommunication, as seen in clause 12.617 in court.
, a matter that was discussed
In December 2018, the government placed a ban on using combustible materials on the external walls and specified attachments of new high rise buildings of 18 metres or higher18
. Materials used in the construction
of tall residential buildings including flats, student accommodation and hospitals were limited to those with a fire rating of Class A1 (non combustible) or A2 s1 d0 (very limited combustibility) under the harmonised European Standard EN 13501. Introduced a year and a half after the
.
disaster, the ban not only followed the fire itself but was encouraged by Dame Judith’s acknowledgement of an industry wide lack of clarity, alongside a widespread public outcry. It meant that all components of the external walls and attachments on buildings over 18m
32 DECEMBER 2019/JANUARY 2020
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