Grenfell Tower inquiry – phase one report NEWS


courage, commitment and bravery of firefighters on the night, but we are disappointed at some of the criticism of individual staff members who were placed in completely unprecedented circumstances and faced the most unimaginable conditions while trying to save the lives of others. ‘On the evacuation of Grenfell


Tower we note the Chairman states he has received no expert evidence to guide him on reaching his conclusion and that a qualitative judgement on the Brigade’s approach might be better reserved for Phase 2. We are also disappointed that measures we have been calling for are not in the recommendations, including the wider use of sprinklers in both new and existing buildings. ‘We have made, and will


continue to review and make changes to our policies, our training and our equipment. We are lobbying for major building regulation change and urgent research into “buildings that fail” on fire safety, which leaves the national “stay put” strategy no longer viable. We will never give up until all of the changes we are calling for to protect residents have been made. ‘We have and will continue to fully assist the Grenfell Tower inquiry to understand what happened in order to learn and prevent such a tragedy ever happening again.’


Fire Protection Association (FPA) The FPA was ‘pleased to see strong recognition of the importance of fire safety management’, but added that ‘however, stronger recognition of the vulnerabilities of modern or refurbished buildings is needed’.


It added that a ’lack of


awareness on this issue has occurred due to vague regulations, little inspection and allowing use of combustible materials in their structure, cladding and insulation. In addition, it believes ‘there needs to be a refocus of building regulations to consider building resilience. Enforcement should


consider that under the right circumstances some fire protection systems in place may fail to do their job, and there should be wider precautions for when these instances occur’. Jonathan O’Neill, managing


director of the FPA, commented: ‘The inquiry confirms the fire, which started in Flat 16 on the fourth floor, was predictable – but the size of this tragedy was completely avoidable. The FPA continues to press for a ban on combustible materials and the installation of sprinklers and high integrity detection and evacuation systems in all high risk occupancies, regardless of height.’


Fire Brigades Union Matt Wrack, general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, commented: ‘The inquiry’s interim report must finally be a turning point for fire safety in the UK. Warning after warning from previous fires were ignored; central government must now take responsibility for ensuring that recommendations are applied nationwide, not just in London; this has never simply been a matter for [LFB]. ‘That change can only be


achieved by establishing a new, credible and accountable body responsible for fire and rescue service policy in the UK. Firefighters stand in solidarity with the bereaved, survivors and residents and share their grief for the lives lost that night. They have an absolute right to ask difficult questions. However, we have said from the start that the order of issues to be investigated has been entirely wrong. ‘The inquiry’s structure prioritises


scrutiny of firefighters, who did everything that they could to save lives, over investigating the critical issues of public safety that led to the fire and caused it to spread in such a disastrous manner. Before any firefighter arrived that night, Grenfell Tower was a death trap. Firefighters that night acted bravely in impossible circumstances, many of them repeatedly risking


their own lives to save others. We welcome that this is reflected in the inquiry’s report. He added: ‘Firefighters and


control room staff are, as with any profession, only able to operate within their training and procedures. It is clear that no one had planned or prepared for an incident like Grenfell. The planning by fire service policy makers did not take account of a fire where compartmentation failed on such a scale. ‘It’s disgraceful that over two


years since the fire [...] there has been no major review or assessment of the stay put policy. This could have been done within months of the fire and we have raised this with government ministers on numerous occasions.


‘Concerns about stay put


policy were raised with central government years before Grenfell, the government must stop dragging its heels and recognise the urgent need to act. There was no other evacuation policy available to firefighters on the night, the report rightly recognises this. Those on the ground believed that a whole-scale evacuation would have been unsafe, potentially causing further fatalities.’ Mr Wrack concluded:


‘We strongly refute the report’s assertion that it would have been possible or safe to evacuate more than 150 people via a narrow smoke-logged stairwell with just 30 firefighters. There is no evidence to suggest that this was possible. It is particularly alarming that the inquiry failed on this issue to seek the advice of its own expert advisor on firefighting matters. There is therefore currently no way of knowing if evacuation could have saved more lives. ‘We are disappointed that


the report makes no reference to the vast additional resources needed to implement its recommendations. It’s time for government to provide national leadership, to properly fund and coordinate fire and rescue services (Article continues overleaf)


www.frmjournal.com DECEMBER 2019/JANUARY 2020 11


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