NEWS
Grenfell Tower inquiry – phase one report Grenfell inquiry’s first phase report published
THE FIRST report from the inquiry outlined that the building’s aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding was ‘the principal reason’ for fire spread, and was critical of London Fire Brigade (LFB).
Report details
Chair Sir Martin Moor-Bick called for ‘urgent action’ by the government to improve high rise fire safety, stating that he wanted to see his recommendations ‘implemented without delay’. The fire was caused by an ‘electrical fault in the large fridge freezer’ of a fourth floor flat, and he stressed that the fire ‘occurred without any fault on the part of the tenant […] and I am pleased to clear him of any blame, given that some people have unfairly accused him of having some responsibility for what happened’.
Fire spread and regulations On the fire’s spread, the report noted that the ‘principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up the building’ was the ACM cladding and the ‘melting and dripping of burning polyethylene’. He described the fire spread as ‘profoundly shocking’, with the polyethylene cores having ‘high calorific value’, which ‘melted and acted as a source of fuel for the growing fire’. Sir Martin also said that, while
there was ‘compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with requirements’ and did not resist the spread of fire, ‘on the contrary they actively promoted it’, although he had not intended to investigate whether the building complied ‘at this stage’.
LFB's incident response Made up of 46 recommendations, the report’s main focus was LFB’s readiness, which Sir Martin said was ‘gravely inadequate’, and ‘preparation and planning for a fire such as Grenfell’ fell short of
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‘what should have been expected’, despite it having known of high rise cladding fires in other countries. LFB was condemned for ‘serious shortcomings’ and ‘systematic failures’ in response, with ‘institutional’ failures putting staff in an ‘invidious position’. Personnel and systems were
‘overwhelmed by the scale’ of the fire, and ‘serious deficiencies’ were identified in command and control, Sir Martin added: ‘I identify a number of serious shortcomings in the response of the LFB, both in the operation of the control room and on the incident ground. It is right to recognise that those shortcomings were for the most part systemic in nature. The “stay put” concept had become an article of faith within the LFB so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable.’ Control room staff ‘undoubtedly
saved lives’, however, a ‘close examination’ of operations revealed ‘shortcomings in practice, policy and training’. He added that
DECEMBER 2019/JANUARY 2020
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supervisors ‘were under the most enormous pressure, but the LFB had not provided its senior control room staff with appropriate training on how to manage a large-scale incident with a large number of FSG [fire survival guidance] calls’, while mistakes ‘made in responding to the Lakanal House fire were repeated’. This was said in reference to the
fact that those giving advice to trapped residents were ‘not aware of the danger of assuming that crews would always reach callers’, and Sir Martin noted this was a ‘key lesson’ that should have been learned from the Lakanal House fire. Operators in the Stratford control room ‘too often treated what callers were telling them with scepticism, in some cases contradicting the caller’, often insisting the fire was only on floor four ‘contrary to what they were being told’. These staff appeared ‘to
have been unable to grasp the fact that it had spread rapidly up the building’, but were also ‘overwhelmed’ by the
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