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FOCUS


Making headway? Two and a half years on, what have we learned from Grenfell, what has changed and how far do we still have to go, asks Aidan Bell


and triggered a mass of protests and debates. The government later launched an inquiry with the aim of understanding why the fl ames spread so rapidly. It was found that the exterior cladding and insulation of the building had offered prime conditions for fire growth and ‘burned like petrol’2


O . Starting on the fourth floor, the fire


quickly spread up the 24 storey residential building externally, largely encouraged by its aluminium polyethylene cladding, which had been installed on the exterior of the tower in a recent renovation. Following Grenfell, it was clear that elements of the tower’s construction had contributed significantly to the event, highlighting the need for change through this harsh awakening. After the fi re, the government commissioned


Dame Judith Hackitt to review building regulations. In her report, she expressed four core issues underpinning the fl awed system: ignorance, indifference, uncertainty regarding


Obstacles to solutions


A year after Grenfell, in July 2018, the government announced that it was taking responsibility for the recladding of existing public residential buildings with fl ammable aluminium composite material (ACM) of 18 metres or more4


safety work’5


. With £400m allocated to this ‘essential , local authorities and housing


associations were provided with the resources to remove and replace dangerous cladding from high rise social housing5


. The responsibility for funding the recladding


of private residential properties was allocated to landlords, freeholders and developers.


30 DECEMBER 2019/JANUARY 2020 www.frmjournal.com


N THE morning of 14 June 2017, ‘one of the UK’s worst modern disasters’1 the Grenfell Tower fi re, killed 72 people


,


responsibilities and inconsistency in enforcement and guidance3


. She also referred to these failures in fire


regulations as a ‘cultural issue across the sector’, suggesting that more focus must be applied to building quality to ensure that residents are safe. Two and a half years on, what has changed to prevent such a catastrophe from happening again?


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