| 51


Evidence presented to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry suggested fault on the part of those manufacturing and assessing construction products – severely undermining confidence in the system by which such products are regulated and come to market. These allegations fall broadly into four categories.


• Failure by manufacturers to disclose all information relevant to the product.


• Failure on the part of those responsible for testing to follow proper procedures.


• Failure to ensure that certificates or classification reports were properly


supported by the assessment process.


• Failure by manufacturers to ensure that product performance claims were


limited to those that were supported by the assessment process and were not misleading.


The following is a summary of the report, which includes proposed remedies. The sheer volume of incidents arising in evidence suggests that this problem is widespread, certainly in relation to fire safety. Systemic issues include:


•Coverage. The most obvious gap in the current system is that only construction


products for which there is a designated standard are covered by the Construction Products Regulation (CPR). The anecdotal estimate is that this accounts for only about one-third of all construction products.


• Purpose. The Regulation was primarily designed for the purpose of creating a level


playing field for a single market, and not for ensuring a safe or sustainable product or building.


•Standardisation. Everything depends upon the relevant standards (where they


exist and are applicable): how a product is to perform, how that is to be tested or assessed, how Conformity Assessment Bodies (including Approved Bodies) are accredited and reviewed by UKAS, and how UKAS itself is reviewed. Although the framework by which standards are developed is a good one, the process can be slow, and the output insufficient and of variable quality.


•Complexity. With five different routes and up to six steps through the system, the CPR


assessment process is so complex that few people properly understand it. And there is a concerning disconnect between those involved in the assessment process and those who design and construct buildings. This renders the process opaque – and a system that cannot be readily understood is unlikely to be routinely observed and enforced.


•Capacity. The whole system (for setting standards, conformity assessment and


oversight) is overloaded and slow. This represents both a threat to quality and a barrier to reform.


•Enforcement. Enforcement has been almost non-existent, so that bad actors


feel that they can bypass the regulations without consequence. Without effective enforcement the market cannot function freely, fairly and safely.


PROPOSED REMEDIES


As far as the regulation of construction products is concerned, the primary targets of the Building Safety Act are coverage and enforcement. Coverage: All construction products will be brought into the scope of the CPR by virtue of a ‘general safety requirement’. Some products not currently covered by the CPR regime can be brought within it by virtue of being covered by a new designated standard (or an existing standard newly recognised as ‘designated’), or by being added to a list of ‘safety-critical’ products to be set out in regulations by the secretary of state. Another way of covering all products would be to require all manufacturers to issue a Declaration of Performance in the way currently required of products regulated under the CPR. This would address the requirement of duty holders needing reliable product performance information to establish their fitness for purpose before specifying and using them, rather than seeking to allocate responsibility after the event. Enforcement: Under the new regime, enforcement is to be strengthened by means of:


• two new regulators – a National Regulator for Construction Products, based in the


Office for Product Safety & Standards, who will work with a new Building Safety Regulator based in the HSE; and


• requirements for manufacturers to share technical documentation and


information with the National Regulator for Construction Products and/or enforcement authorities.


The ultimate objective must be to set clear requirements that call for honesty on the part of manufacturers in respect of full disclosure to the Approved Body conducting the assessment – with a breach of any part of this duty being an offence, subject to new sanctions available to the Regulator. In the experience of WPA and its members, clarity about a duty to act honestly, with any breach risking a significant sanction, would be welcomed by most of the industry. Regulated enforcement is also an encouragement to those who play by the rules, if it means they no longer have to compete with those who do not do so.


CONCLUSIONS


Amongst the least edifying spectacles of the Grenfell Tower tragedy have been the arguments deployed by successive parties in


Above: Gordon Ewbank: The WPA welcomes the conclusions of the review


www.ttjonline.com | November/December 2023 | TTJ


denying or deflecting responsibility. It is for the Public Inquiry to investigate and report on the failings that occurred and by whom, but there are some truths that should be taken as evident.


• That it is for product manufacturers to develop products that do the job expected


of them, and to market them honestly, making no false claims.


• That it is for Conformity Assessment Bodies to test and assess those products against


defined specifications, impartially and independently, so that those who must rely upon performance claims can do so with confidence.


• That it is for designers to choose products with the performance that is fit for purpose,


and then design them into the works so that the performance can be achieved.


• That it is for constructors to bring everything together with the same objective


in mind, using imagination to find better ways of doing things – but not in a careless manner, by throwing away all the good work that has brought the product and design to that stage, in order to save money.


The WPA has been fighting these battles for many years. By promoting proven and effective flame retardant systems for wood through our independently assessed Approved Formulation scheme, auditing and accrediting reputable FR treatment companies and product manufacturers and highlighting examples of poor product performance to government. We welcome the conclusions of this review and will keep an active watch on how government responds – reporting back to our members and industry sector on a regular basis. ■


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85