TECHNOLOGY THREATS Ӏ SPECIAL REPORT
information and cannot be
shared publicly,” Coast Guard cybersecurity chief Rear Admiral Jay Vann told reporters. “Our captains of the ports
around the country will be working directly with crane owners and operators to deliver the directive and verify compliance,” he added. Vann did, however, explain the underlying reason for official concern and the specific nation- state potential actor they had in mind: “People’s Republic of China (PRC)-manufactured ship-to-shore cranes make up the largest share of the global market and account for nearly 80 percent of cranes at US ports,” he said.
“By design, these cranes
may be controlled, serviced and programmed from remote locations. These features
38 CRANES TODAY
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potentially leave PRC- manufactured cranes vulnerable to exploitation.” The specific manufacturer they
have in mind is Shanghai Zenhua Heavy Industries, more commonly known as ZPMC. Its dominance of the global ship-to-shore crane market is huge. As Vann said, 80% of ship-to-shore cranes at US ports come from ZPMC. The figure for Europe is as high or higher. Indeed, almost a year before the White House executive order, in early 2023, US defence officials were expressing worries about ZPMC, stating that it could very well be used by Beijing as a spying tool.
It is not only crane control
systems that have been perceived as a threat: scanners, cameras, and monitors are under suspicion as
well. Along with Shanghai Zhenua, two other brands of Chinese-made technology – a software package called Logink and security scanners made by Nuctech Company – have come under scrutiny. The software “can collect massive amounts of sensitive business and foreign government data” and could provide the Chinese government access to “sensitive logistics data” the officials’ advisory says. The debate is comparable to the dispute which arouse in the UK recently over whether software from the Chinese company Huawei should be used in Generation 5 mobile phone network or whether that would be a security risk. The parallel, though, is not exact. Software for most ship-to-shore cranes does not originate in China; most of it is manufactured by
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