INB O X YOUR COMMENT S
outnumber KLM staff three times on a comparable basis. KLM paid Alitalia €500 million, I believe,
as a “deposit” towards the merger. As the Italians could not agree staff cuts, etc, KLM walked away and should have had it money back. It never did. However, the grim reality is that KLM
cannot devolve itself from Air France. The systems are linked, finance and leasing is cross-guaranteed by Air France and KLM and so on. The truth is if Air France goes bust, it will take KLM with it. That would be a sad and unfitting end to the world’s oldest airline!
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➜ C AP E TONIANM I did some work on integrating the systems in about 2007, with both airlines, and the attitude of the Air France staff was exactly as described above by LuganoPirate. Whereas the Dutch spoke excellent English and were happy to do so, the French couldn’t or wouldn’t, even though it was made clear from the outset that the project language was English. The French were a waste of office space, utterly negative, always looking for problems and ways of avoiding work, and contributing nothing, while the Dutch worked hard and looked for solutions and a better outcome.
➜ ED S KI7 7 7 Following the adage “Never waste a good crisis”, according to a major Dutch newspaper the KLM management will try to restore the old structure of Air France-KLM back in the days the group was created. Have a French chairman to “run” the group, and have a Dutch right-hand man. The coming weeks will show whether the Dutch will succeed, or whether Air France will drag all other parts of the group with it to their demise. Workers at Air France are finally starting to realise that the current
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situation is catastrophic. With oil prices rapidly increasing, fierce competition, diminishing customer loyalty and both the French and the Dutch governments clearly unwilling to interfere and/or finance the ensuing situation, they are finally waking up.
➜ B A789 What was the rationale for KLM to link up with Air France? Air France has a history of strikes and tense labour relations, so why would any airline want to join forces with such a company?
➜ ED S KI7 7 7 In 2001/2002 KLM was having financial and organisational problems. As the consolidation in Europe started and IAG and Lufthansa became the dominant players, KLM was deemed to be too small an airline to survive. Around that time we saw the demise of Swiss and Sabena (a Belgian airline) as well. KLM was looking for partners, but both British Airways and Lufthansa were seen as not attracted nor interested for different reasons. Then, partner Northwest Airlines was also not the healthiest of organisations, and had a fairly old fleet. So it was more of a target than an investor in the industry. Air France was the only airline available. The old structure, something KLM
seems to want to revert to, was a holding with two or more brands under this Air France-KLM umbrella. With the French making up two-thirds and the Dutch (KLM, Martinair and Transavia) one-third of the organisation. In order to keep labour relations under control, it was agreed that investments in the fleet would follow this line as well. Management would be formed on the basis of a French chairman, Mr Spinetta, and a Dutch second in command, Mr van Wijk. In later years, due to the economic situation, Air France-KLM was forced to adapt both
organisations to the new reality. KLM was very successful in reorganising its operation by cutting staff and costs and improving on their performance, hard and soft product, and subsequently on load factors, revenue and profit. Air France lagged behind, hindered by strikes, political influencing, bad management and increasingly bad relations between management and personnel, including the unions. Where KLM kept its finances tightly
under control, helped by a steady course and decent relations between management and unions, Air France didn’t meet the requirements. Air France still has a huge workforce in comparison to KLM for the amount of planes. Somehow the French will have to come to their senses and start realising that it is 2018 with global competition. Like it or not, in the airline industry the market dictates. No longer are unions in charge and are governments able and willing to support ailing “national” carriers. The current investment structure
makes no sense anymore. Any normal commercial company would invest in the most profitable and well-run side of the business, while the other part sorts out its problems. Surely KLM personnel feel like that. Frustration and animosity between the two sides of the company are increasing. It remains a question how long this situation can continue and if relations can be re-established. Did KLM make the right decision in
2001-2002? With hindsight: maybe not. But who else was able and available at that time to support KLM? For now the French will have to sort
out their own mess, kept afloat by a moneymaker like KLM, but KLM is not generating enough profit to sustain the losses caused by the French strikes. Air France is rapidly losing customer loyalty, obviously not helped by having CDG as
bus ine s s tr a v el ler .c om
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