The client was in shock. How could this happen! The question went abegging. Nobody seemed to have an answer. That’s when new theories emerged, as to how the straps could have given way.


The “Theory” One such theory was that the tension on the straps holding the pipes together was far more than what should be allowed; perhaps close to the limiting value and gets aggravated while the pipes negotiate the “S” bend over the stinger. The straps’ tension exceeds the yield value and eventually gives way. This theory gained currency fast. It manifested itself as an MoC (Management of Change).


MoC Well, an MoC is a potent tool by which last minute changes during an installation activity at sea are tackled. Sometimes MoCs are resorted to for a flaw in the approved procedure that hasn’t taken into account subtle aspects peculiar to the vessel or process. An MoC is resorted to when there is a change in execution plan.


An MoC, typically, will state the current scenario, the problems faced on account of the same and the proposed change. The proposed change must be backed up by engineering calculations/ analysis to show that the control parameters would be within limits even after the proposed changes are incorporated.


The HSE team onboard and the management would brainstorm the change to identify the potential risks and the severity of impacts and incorporate measures that would mitigate the risks and minimize the severity of impact.


The document that runs into several pages with enclosures of engineering drawings, hand sketches, photographs and often prints of e-mail correspondence, takes shape after incorporating the views expressed by all the stakeholders. MoC gets signed by all concerned before it becomes an extension of the approved procedure and gets


50 | The Report • June 2019 • Issue 88


implemented. The MoC drafted for reducing the tension in the straps was debated for several days by all stakeholders including MWS and finally approved.


Dissenting note I stated in no uncertain terms that they were treating the symptom rather than the cause. I advised them to identify the root cause and tackle it scientifically rather than embrace an ad-hoc solution. My advice fell on deaf ears and was not at all taken cognizance of. Even the client representative stated that the stinger is not within the scope of the MWS. Was he politely saying, “none of your business”? I wasn’t too sure.


MoC. The OCM snapped back that exceptions must be treated as exceptions and must not be a cause for worry. However after a while more number of straps failed. I told the management that the problem lies in the stinger. The pipeline while being lowered into the water was rubbing against some hard portion on the stinger leading to the failures. I suggested that the stinger be raised out of water and thoroughly examined for defects.


Piggyback Pipelines


“Re-Lay” With the MoC in place the euphoria was back on track. Pipelay recommenced. The resumption of pipelay was a much needed boost for morale of the personnel on board. Though on a slow pace Initially, the pipelay gradually picking up momentum. However to everyone’s utter chagrin, within 24 hours of resumption, a few straps parted. Work was halted. Quite a few eye- brows were raised. Soon the concerns were brushed aside stating that the failures of straps were stray incidents.


The pipeline was pulled back, necessary repairs effected and the work resumed. New piggyback blocks and straps were incorporated and once again pipes were pushed to the seabed.


The Red Flag. As MWS, I tried to reason out that the latest strap failures are not adequately explained in the light of the reduced tension now being applied post


No one was willing to pay attention, though the losses due to frequent failures were mounting. The saga of pipelay, strap breaking, work stoppage, pull back, repairs and resumption of work gradually became the order of the day. It was cyclic in nature. Not a single day passed without a failure. But sadly though, complacency had set in. The mighty modern vessel with immaculate track record became home to unprofessional approach. No one had courage to offer an explanation nor had the guts to hazard another ‘MoC’. In the process the vessel could lay only about 5 KM of pipeline in nearly 10 days since commencement of operations.


The Fall-out The morning meetings witnessed muted mumblings. Nobody offered an alternate blue-print. No one was looking the MWS in the eye! Morale of the crew was beginning to go down.


The progress of work became tardy. Surprisingly the management was yet unwilling to buy into my argument that the problem could be with the stinger. It was brushed aside as mere conjecture.


The fact was that despite the major loss of face and massive loss of productivity, they had got comfortable with the pattern that emerged, consisting of Pipelay - Strap breaking - Work stoppage – Pull back – Repairs - Resumption of work. The cycle went on and on. As pipes got deeper and deeper their confidence turned shallower. They even seemed to turn a blind eye to the sagging self-esteem of the men on the job.


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