Russian use of warfare T
his article seeks to explore both the why and the how
of Russia’s use of ‘hybrid warfare’ - particularly utilising the information, political, and non-combatant spheres - in the modern age in order to suggest that not only is Russia’s use of
tactics against the West far from new, what Russia wants is hardly unpredictable.
There is currently a sense among the UK and its Allies, especially in the light of the Skripal case and clear Russian intervention in various western electoral and political systems, that the West is under attack by Russia, with the implication that Russia seeks our destruction.
Furthermore, following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, we have become fixated upon the idea that the actions of Vladimir Putin’s Russia are frighteningly new and unpredictable.
Russia overtly uses the information space to demonstrate its own view of its place in the world, and its relationship with the West. Through this, we can better understand, and thereby seek to counter, Russia’s efforts.
The relationship between Russia and the West
It is first necessary to explore why Russia has turned its attention to the West in recent years. The relationship between Russia and the Western Allies is one clearly conditioned by a classic security dilemma: both sides view the other as the aggressor in a deteriorated relationship, and both perceive in the other the capability and intent to destroy them.
From Russia this is grounded in historical experience of attack from the West from the
26 © CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – WINT ER 2018
Teutonic Knights (in the 12th century) through to Hitler and indeed the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and most events since.
It is most likely the case that Russia views itself as the new status quo power in defence of the Westphalian state- and rules-based world order (which elevates the centrality of sovereignty) against the US, EU and Western political and economic institutions (which are globalist and rights-based).
The Russian perception is that Western intervention has brought nothing but chaos (view Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, the Maidan in Ukraine) whilst their interventions have been aimed at restoring stability and preserving classical features of the Westphalian world order (Georgia, Syria, Ukraine).
To secure itself, Russia must therefore be a stable, powerful nation recognised as a peer of other major powers. Russia seeks to be a “normal great power” and believes the US and Allies seek unfairly to prevent this. Russia very likely seeks an end-state where it is seen as a great power, equal to other great powers in a (Westphalian) rules-based world order. All subsequent ways and means descend from this clearly-articulated statement of “ends”. In this effort, they view themselves as acting defensively.
In contrast, the Russians believe US and NATO policy to be aggressive towards Russia. Putin has stated: “As you know, NATO and the United States have recently outlined their defence strategy. It is an offensive strategy… Let's be clear: this is offensive infrastructure that is being created in Europe. This is about violations of provisions of the 1987 INF Treaty by the United States.”
Further Russian messaging underlines that, for instance, their role in Syria is to restore stability and fight the international terrorism
www. c i t y s e cur i t yma ga z in e . com hybrid
caused by illegitimate intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, to restore a preferable status quo disturbed by the West. Putin has on numerous occasions reiterated Russia as the rule-following power, while the West ignores or abuses the rules as they see fit.
The view is likely that Russia’s classical interests-based foreign policy is threatened by the West’s destabilising values-based policies, which push dangerous, sovereignty-violating and interventionist ideas such as individualistic human rights and economy-crushing robber- capitalism.
Countering the Western Narrative
Russia’s counter-position to this is manifold: they will employ both positive soft-power messaging and disruptive activities in the UK and the West, most likely with the intent of creating an internal challenge to current western policies towards, and perceptions of, Russia.
Constructively, they employ soft-power elements to build a more favourable view of Russia as a legitimate and responsible actor. Paired to this is what we perceive to be the pernicious Russian interference, which is aimed at stimulating public dissent (for instance against the safety of vaccines and GMO crops) and distrust of government, and supporting political actors who are favourable to Russia. Russia’s intermediate goal is very likely to set more favourable conditions for Russia’s recognition as a legitimate status quo actor by making the West’s values-based policies seem untenable or unjustified domestically.
To spoil the aims of the Western states, Russia will use all its available information operational assets to counter the Western narrative, and present their own narrative to Western audiences. The aim is not, most
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