Analysis: Networks


Green incident, the TATP main charge did not explode, reducing the effectiveness and lethality of the device. Notably, in the context of recent attacks in Europe and North America, the majority of perpetrators whose devices successfully functioned appear to have spent time fighting alongside jihadist terrorist organisations in foreign conflict theatres. These include members of the extended terror cell who perpetrated the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks and the 22 March 2016 Brussels attacks, Salman Abedi, who carried out the 22 May 2017 suicide attack on the Manchester Arena, and Ahmad Khan Rahimi, the individual behind the 17-19 September 2016 New York and New Jersey IED attacks. The trend suggests that, despite the proliferation of online materials regarding IED construction, many would-be terrorists rely on real-world training in order to successfully carry out an IED attack. .


Source of the Threat


2017 failed suicide attack in a tunnel adjoining the New York Subway. Suicide IEDs give a number of tactical advantages to the operative, including the ability to make last- moment alterations to the location in which the device is functioned. Suicide attacks also eliminate the possibility that a suspicious package would be identified and the area evacuated before the device is functioned.


Radio-controlled devices have also been used on a number of occasions in this period, most notably in Al-Qaeda’s 11 March 2004 coordinated attacks on multiple train carriages in Madrid which killed 192 people and injured over 2,000 others. The attack remains the most lethal single terrorist incident to have taken place in Europe this century.


A large percentage of the IED attacks identified in this period were carried out during the morning rush hour (defined as 0700hrs to 1000hrs) on weekdays, almost certainly also due to a desire to maximise the number of casualties in the attack.


In recent years, a large number of terrorist IEDs in Europe and North America have failed to function as intended, or at all, due to technical or material deficiencies in the device. Examples of this include the 15 September 2017 Parsons Green attack and the 11 December 2017 New York Subway bombing. Although a fireball was caused by the initiation of the detonator in the Parsons


© CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – WINT ER 2018


Based on current activity levels and targeting trends, terrorism associated with Islamist- extremist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and IS currently poses the greatest threat to European and North American passenger rail networks. Whilst in recent years there has been an increase in terrorist activity associated with the far-right, at present many of these emerging groups lack the operational capability of established terrorist networks such as IS. Moreover, the majority of far-right plots and attacks in recent years have focused on ethnic, sexual or religious minorities, or political opponents.


At present, there are few indicators to suggest that such groups are likely to attempt to carry out mass casualty terrorist attacks on passenger rail networks in the immediate future.


A number of anarchist and far-left militant groups across Europe and North America have demonstrated some interest in acts of vandalism and sabotage against rail networks in association with a broad range of political causes. This includes the US-based ‘Pudget Sound Anarchists’, who have shared videos online promoting industrial sabotage of rail networks in opposition to fracking. However, there is very little evidence at present to suggest that such groups possess a rising capacity and/or willingness to target rail commuters with lethal intent.


The highest volume of terrorist activity directed against the UK rail transport network in recent decades originated from the IRA. Between 1991 and 1997, there were a reported 41 IRA attacks on transport targets across England. These attacks featured a total of 81 separate IEDs and resulted in three deaths. During this period, there were also more than 6,500 telephoned bomb threats and a further 9,400 suspicious objects reported across the rail network. Whilst the IRA’s intention was not to carry out mass


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casualty attacks, the sheer volume of activity, in addition to the added challenges posed by copycats and malicious pranksters, placed significant financial pressure on UK transport networks and the resources of police and rail security services.


Rail Security Enhancements


Following the peak of the IRA campaign against the UK mainland, review of existing rail security weaknesses led to the implementation of a broader security strategy to target-harden the UK rail network and reduce the risks facing it. Security measures introduced in the intervening period include:


Installation of CCTV systems across the rail network to assist in counter-terrorism investigations and provide security personnel and stationmasters with greater visibility of the facilities.


Improved lighting to deter terrorists and improve site visibility.


Repairing gaps in perimeter fencing along the rail network to limit access to unauthorised persons.


Installation of transparent or blast- resistant bins to limit the effectiveness of IEDs placed inside them.


Encouraging staff and passengers to identify and report suspicious behaviour and unattended packages.


Future Trends


The terrorist threat to passenger rail networks is highly likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Despite the destruction of the IS ‘Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria, the group continues to pose a major threat to the West in the form of a decentralised network.


Associated risks are likely to emerge from the return of foreign fighters previously aligned with jihadi terrorist groups in current conflict theatres. Such persons could potentially play a leading role in the formation of extremist hubs and the diffusion of terrorist skills and operational tradecraft throughout support groups in the West. In the face of these and other threats, the need for innovative, intelligence-led security solutions to the heightened threat has never been greater. By identifying and analysing trends from previous terrorist attacks, we increase our odds of stopping the next one.


Gareth Herbert Intelligence Analyst, VSG www.vsg.co.uk ..................................................................


If you see something suspicious: move away and call 999 or the police Anti-Terrorist Hotline on 0800 789 321.


Or, while travelling on the rail network, text 61016 or call 0800 40 50 40 to contact British Transport Police.


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