Threat A Passenger Rail


A


n overview of terrorist attacks on passenger rail networks in Europe and North America focused on current and emerging tactical and targeting trends.


It is now over 13 years since the 7/7 bombings inflicted mass casualties across the London transport network on the morning of 7 July 2005. In the interim period, railway networks and subway systems in Europe and North America have remained the target of a large number of terrorist plots and attacks featuring a number of attack methodologies.


The Current Threat


On the morning of 22 March 2016, Islamic State (IS) carried out the bombing of the Maalbeek Metro Station in Brussels as part of a coordinated improvised explosive device (IED) attack on rail and aviation targets in the Belgian capital. Twenty people were killed and over 100 others injured in the attack. The cell responsible for the attacks was part comprised of the wider network that carried out the 13 November 2015 marauding assault on multiple locations in Paris.


Since the Brussels bombing, there have been additional successful or attempted attacks on rail networks in several major cities including London, St Petersburg, Brussels and New York. Whilst only the St Petersburg attack on 3 April 2017 resulted in any fatalities, the terrorist threat to rail passenger networks across the Western world remains high and will continue to pose a major threat to public safety and business operations for the foreseeable future.


14 © CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – WINT ER 2018 Why Rail Networks?


Rail passenger facilities typically rely on open architecture and are designed to facilitate the free flow of large numbers of passengers across the network. This increases the vulnerability of the network to attack by placing limitations on the viability of increased security measures which do not result in unreasonable delay and inconvenience to commuters. The fact that rail networks naturally extend over a large area also provides terrorist operatives with multiple points of entry into and exit from the facilities. In addition, the existence of vast rural stretches are inevitably highly challenging to effectively patrol and secure.


Attack Methodologies


There are a number of frequently used methods of attack against rail networks, including bladed weapons and IEDs. Less frequently, attacks have also involved the use of firearms; for example, the 21 August 2015 failed IS-inspired attack on a Paris-bound train in Thalys, which was thwarted by the intervention of three American tourists who wrestled the gunman to the ground.


Less orthodox attack methodologies include the 20 March 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system by the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo. The liquid sarin was deployed in plastic bags which were


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punctured by the terrorist operatives in multiple train carriages. The attack killed 12 people and injured over 1,000 others. Whilst a range of terrorist groups have continued to demonstrate interest in attacks using chemical or biological weapons, the resources and technical capability required to manufacture a chemical or biological agent are prohibitively high for many aspiring hostile actors, rendering it an unfeasible methodology.


A further possible method is deploying a train derailment device for use against passenger trains travelling at high speed, a tactic which has been promoted in several high-profile jihadist magazines. The first documented reporting of such a device being used for this purpose was of an attack in early October 2018 against an inter-city passenger train travelling between Nuremberg and Munich. Although the device failed to derail the train, its impact upon the vehicle was felt by the driver. Threatening letters in Arabic and Arabic graffiti indicating an Islamist extremist motive were subsequently recovered at the scene of the attack.


IED Attack Trends


The vast majority of IED attacks on passenger rail networks in Europe and North America in recent years have featured the use of devices initiated by a timer or a suicide operative. Examples include the 15 September 2017 Parsons Green bombing and the 11 December


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