toward smaller groups spread out over more locations. The result was that more aircraft were deployed earlier than in the past 10 years. For example, during 2020, approximately 36 helicopters were put on 90-day ‘surge’ contracts by the USFS. The surge fleet, which included Type 1 and Type 2 helicopters, was added to those already under contract. With the additional helicopters in the field for initial attack, there was less need to maintain large fire camps, thus minimizing the risk of spreading the virus.
There were a lot of positives that came out of this. Aerial assets were based in closer proximity to fires, and there was less need to move people around. It remains to be seen if this tactical shift in aircraft and aircrew deployments will prevail post- COVID-19. But the industry and firefighting agencies did a wonderful job in the face of the coronavirus in tandem with the tremendous increase in fire activity.
Still, further challenges must be met. There is a threat to the long-term financial
stability of the aerial firefighting industry, as the USFS has essentially switched back to a contract award system based on the cheapest price, as opposed to the best value. With cutbacks in available funding, vendors lose some of the safety net within their organization as they become leaner by necessity.
One of the components of this trend has been a transition to more call-when- needed (CWN) contracts, and away from exclusive-use (EU) contracts. According to USFS statistics, in both 2019 and 2020, there were a total of 22 large air tankers on CWN and 13 on EU. But far more helicopters — approximately 400 — were under CWN in 2020, in contrast to 150 in 2019. For both years, 104 helicopters were on EU.
There is no question that EU contracts, which guarantee an agreed-upon pay rate over a specific contract period, provide better maintenance stability for vendors alongside higher standards and quality of operation. However, CWN contracts have
a level of risk that is unique to the aerial firefighting industry, and could hurt us about five to 10 years down the road. Simply put, CWN contracts are a big gamble. It’s true that more money is earned under CWN contracts when the operator is working, but during down times no money is earned. As a result, the CWN contracting trend can have a negative impact on our country’s aerial firefighting capability because it will effectively drive operators toward other kinds of work such as construction or power-line patrol.
The CWN trend already has driven some operators away from firefighting altogether, which means a loss of assets to the fire agencies. Where possible, some are even shifting their targeted customer base outside of the U.S. I know of one helicopter operator that historically got 60 percent of its annual business from the U.S. government. Over the past year, the company has had to focus more on international customers, which now account for 75 percent of its yearly business, thanks to the reduction of the USFS budget. For
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