TECH TALK
will replace voice as the primary means to route commercial aircraft. Legacy aircraft are being retrofitted with updated avionics and communications capabilities which also increase risks in general since no two aircraft configurations are ever exactly alike, as well as due to the enlarged complexity of the aviation ecosystem. The research that uncovered some of the security flaws
was based upon performing analysis in a laboratory setting, and in fact, they did not actually have access to many of the named systems at all. They created simulations based upon downloaded firmware, information found in documentation and press releases, and other available data. This is quite impressive in itself and also quite repeatable by those with ill intent. The results of these simulations are what is found in the
published paper and follow-on presentations, neither of which can be considered conclusive and comprehensive security testing results. With that said, it is inexcusable that a cyber-security
researcher with no specific experience with aircraft (or the other transportation modes identified in his paper) is able to find significant flaws with critical communications systems. The vendors identified in his report should be holding their engineering teams responsible for not
performing more invasive and comprehensive security testing on their products, as well as for not identifying more stringent security requirements in the requirements/design phases of the product development cycle in the first place. No complex product is ever without flaws, but flaws of omission are still flaws. Most on-board systems use embedded software to
provide functionality, and thus differ from desktop PCs in how security solutions can be implemented. “Mission- critical systems, such as an aircraft onboard communication, navigation and surveillance (CNS) systems, cannot rely on standard cyber security commercial products such as anti- virus or signature based intrusion detection systems (IDS), due to the nature of their embedded operating systems and application code. They are simply not up to the challenge of defending against many of today’s cyber-attacks,” according to Alan Gallagher, president of Virtual Security International. Other avionics and aircraft on-board systems have similar issues, in that purpose-built software for specific functionality is unlike general-purpose operating systems such as Windows-based computers, which can host security applications with continuous updates to virus definitions, malware protection or firewall applications. Since embedded systems need to have the same level,
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