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48


Legal Focus


JANUARY 2013


Competition Enforcement France


Continuing with our look at Competition Enforcement, we turn our attention to France. This month, Lawyer Monthly speaks to Muriel Perrier from French law firm Vivien & Associés in Paris. Here she discusses with us her work, the competition framework that governs companies in France and her opinions on Microsoft's failure to fulfill promises it made three years ago to offer consumers a choice of browsers.


Please introduce yourself, your role and your firm. What are your main activities related to competition and anti-trust law?


Vivien & Associés is a French law firm, with a team of 30 lawyers, providing advisory and litigation services for most areas of international business, in particular corporate law, competition and distribution, commercial contract, tax, labour and employment. Most of the attorneys have an important experience in an international environment.


Personally, I have particular expertise in the areas of competition law and commercial contracts. I assist industrial groups on anti-trust and merger issues in the context of mergers and acquisitions and industrial/commercial partnerships. I also assist and represent clients during investigations and court actions in relation to competition law (cartels, abuse of a dominant position) before the antitrust authorities and the commercial courts. My client basis represents diverse economic sectors such as consumer products (consumer electronics, computer equipment, office supplies), pharmaceuticals and medical devices (optics, etc.) energy, automotives.


What is the legal framework as regards competition law which the companies should be aware of for their activities in France?


I believe there are significant developments both as regards procedure and the substance.


As under EU competition law, the trend under www.lawyer-monthly.com


French competition law is definitely the increase in the amount of the penalties imposed on the companies participating in anticompetitive practices, in particular price fixing cartels.


In 2011, the French Competition Authority has fined the four major laundry detergent manufacturers active in France an amount of € 397.9 million, for having coordinated their sales prices and promotion policy towards the French retailers (supermarkets and hypermarkets). The decision was rendered after the European Commission had itself fined three of the four companies for an amount exceeding €315 million.


This year, the French Competition Authority has fined different anticompetitive agreements in the packaged flour sector for a total amount of €242.4 million.


It is also to be noted that these two cases were revealed by one of the participating companies which used the leniency procedure and obtained full immunity from fines. Today, most cartels are discovered with such procedure.


The other element that I would like to point out is about the settlement procedure used for cases in relation to prohibition of anticompetitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position under EU or French rules. The procedure is, in practice, often used by the Competition Authority in case of unilateral or vertical practices restricting market access. This procedure may be of interest for the


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