9/11 Commission Recommendations
The 9/11 Commission recommendations need to be adhered “...Abdulmutallab was not scheduled
to and upgraded as we garner more information as to
how terrorists criminals travel. However, many of these to be questioned by border
recommendations, even taken individually, could have been
sufficient to stop Abdulmutallab. Here are highlights of inspectors until landing in Detroit...”
recommendations still not in place taken directly from the
9/11 Final Report, many of which are exactly the failure that data mining: instead, a government-wide team of border
has been acknowledged by government officials: and transportation officials should be working together. A
modern border and immigration system should combine a
Strategies for Aviation and Transportation Security (p. 390) biometric entry-exit system with accessible files on visitors
Recommendation: Improved use of the “no-fly” and “automatic and immigrants, along with intelligence on indicators of
selectee” lists should not be delayed while the argument about terrorist travel. [emphasis added] (p. 388-389)
a successor to CAPPS (computer assisted airport screening
which applies to checked luggage only) continues. This Assessing the 2009 Christmas Plot
screening function should be performed by TSA (Transportation In the case of Abdulmutallab, intelligence existed but there
Security Administration created after 9/11), and it should was a gap in aviation and border systems obtaining that
utilise the larger set of watch-lists maintained by the federal information in a timely manner. The intelligence itself was
government. [emphasis added] (p. 393) also not sufficiently analysed or shared across agencies,
Recommendation: The TSA and the Congress must give highlighting issues with inadequate risk assessment software
priority attention to improving the ability of screening tools and failures to integrate the border and aviation
checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As a start, systems sufficiently with intelligence. It thus was of little
each individual selected for special screening should be consequence that the intelligence was as solid or strong
screened for explosives. [emphasis added] (p. 393) as it was, if it could not reach the right people at the
right time with the authority to make the right decisions.
Terrorist Travel (p. 383) However, had the intelligence and border community had
Recommendation: The United States should combine Abdulmutallab’s full immigration history available when an
terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement intelligence officer in Nigeria delivered a report on visits and
in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel phone calls from Abdulmutallab’s prominent and credible
facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility. father concerned about his son cutting off communication
Since officials at the borders encounter travellers and their and radical leanings (al Qaeda requires a communication
documents first … , they must work closely with intelligence cut-off from families when a sworn member is designated
officials. [emphasis added] (p. 385) to be conduct a mission), as well as visa information and the
young man’s prior visits to the United States that included
A Biometric Screening System (p. 385) a religious conference, both a visa revocation and ‘no fly’
When people travel internationally, they usually move would more likely have been generated, with or without
through defined channels, or portals. They may seek to British intelligence pertaining to a denied student visa or
acquire a passport. They may apply for a visa. They stop at more general U.S. information regarding a Nigerian dubbed
ticket counters, gates and exit controls at the airports and for a mission in coming months.
seaports. Upon arrival, they pass through inspection points. The U.S. State Department had more than sufficient
They may transit to another gate to get on an airplane. … authority to revoke Abdulmutallab’s visa; statements stating
Each of these checkpoints or portals is a screening - a otherwise are a matter of long-held State Department policy,
chance to establish that people are who they say they are
and are seeking access for their stated purpose, to intercept
identifiable suspects, and to take effective action.
The job of protection is shared among many defined
checkpoints. By taking advantage of them all, we need not
depend on any one point in the system to do the whole job.
The challenge is to see the common problem across agencies
and functions and develop a conceptual framework—an
architecture—for an effective screening system. [emphasis
added] (p. 385-386)
The U.S. Border Screening System
All points in the border system - from consular offices to
immigration services offices - will need appropriate electronic
access to an individual’s file. Scattered units at Homeland
Security and the State Department perform screening and
56 Register now for FREE instant access to ASI online by visiting www.asi-mag.com February 2010 Aviationsecurityinternational
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