Foes Edge Closer to U.S. I
ran’s shrinking footprint in the region has not gone
unnoticed. The Persian Gulf monarchies, once fearful of Tehran’s reach, are pursuing
missiles and drones. According to regional intelligence
sources, the strikes have severely constrained Hezbollah’s ability to resupply and operate, while Hamas finds itself politically isolated and militarily degraded following mul- tiple leadership losses. Compounding these setbacks
is the toppling of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government, a cru- cial pillar for Iran’s land corridor to the Mediterranean for years. With instability in Damascus threatening the regime’s lifeline to Lebanon, Tehran’s ability to main- tain external influence is shrinking. The so-called “axis of resis-
tance,” once considered a shadowy but formidable challenge to region- al adversaries, now looks fractured and weakened. If the regime’s external position
looks precarious, the situation at home is even worse. Iran’s economy has been battered
by years of sanctions, mismanage- ment, and corruption. Inflation is rampant, and unemployment among the youth, the overwhelming major- ity of the population, remains high. The rial, Iran’s currency, contin- ues to plummet, and once-thriving
closer security coordination with Washington and Jerusalem. Even non-state allies are showing signs of fatigue. Analysts note that Hezbollah,
once overflowing with Iranian cash and military resources, now faces dwindling public support in Lebanon, where economic collapse has left citizens increasingly resentful. Meanwhile, the Houthis in
urban centers like Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz have experienced a rise in poverty and unemployment unseen since the Iran-Iraq War. The Islamic Republic’s Revolu-
tionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has expanded surveillance technolo- gies, employing facial recognition and artificial intelligence to track protesters. Authorities have throttled inter-
net access and ramped up censor- ship, but digital-savvy dissidents continue to use third-party proxy servers to spread videos of protests and news of executions — of athletes, journalists, dancers, and influencers — to the outside world. For American policymakers, the
larger question is whether regime change in Iran is desirable in the larger context of bringing stability to the region and what such a transfor- mation might entail. The memories of Iraq and Afghanistan weigh heavily in Wash- ington, where lawmakers across party lines remain wary of efforts that could be construed as foreign intervention, create a political vacuum that could be occupied by extremists, or create an unknown stalemate that will force a recon-
later joined by the United States, focused on targeting and demolishing several of the regime’s nuclear and military sites. Proponents of engagement counter that without dialogue, Tehran may accelerate weapons development unchecked. In addition to military collaboration with Israel, the Trump administration so
DEAL IAEA chief Rafael Grossi, left, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, right, sign an agreement in Cairo in September to resume nuclear program inspections.
Yemen, initially emboldened by regime support, have faced setbacks from U.S. and Saudi-led strikes that destroyed weapons shipments and diminished their ability to threaten Red Sea shipping lanes. — L.D.
figuration of regional policies. But Iran, analysts argue, is not
Iraq or Afghanistan. Crucially, the Iranian people themselves and not a foreign invader are openly demand- ing change. In Washington, bipartisan voic-
es are converging on the notion of amplified support for Iranian dis- sidents. Policy proposals now circulating
include expanding access to internet technologies, reimposing maximum pressure sanctions, and isolating Tehran diplomatically. After the 12-day war and Assad’s
ouster in Syria, momentum behind the concept of ousting the regime has returned, particularly in right-of- center policy circles. There is talk not only of “Maxi-
mum Pressure,” the successful Iran policy that dominated President Don- ald Trump’s first term, but also “Max- imum Support,” a movement to back the Iranian people in their own quest for freedom. The emphasis in Washington,
however, is to stop short of calling for regime change. For now.
Lisa Daftari is an investigative writer on Middle East policy and counterterrorism.
far pursued a cautious mix of targeted sanctions and limited diplomacy, but the regime’s increasing weakness and growing vulnerabilities raise new possibilities: Would U.S. policy supporting regime change be a better approach to long-lasting stability for the region? International responses
remain mixed. European governments, deeply reliant on Middle Eastern stability,
are increasingly sympathetic to Iranian protesters but remain wary of urging regime change outright. Russia and China,
meanwhile, have doubled down on ties with Tehran, viewing the Islamic Republic as both an arms and energy partner, but even Beijing has expressed frustration with Iran’s volatility, and neither came to Iran’s rescue in the latest war. — L.D.
NOVEMBER 2025 | NEWSMAX 59
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