Decades of neglect aſter the Cold War have depleted personnel and equipment levels. So, Europe will require sustained higher levels of funding and a more resilient defense-industrial base to repair the damage for years to come.
Consider Spain. Even before the announcement of the new 5% target, Spain obtained an exemption from the target. Belgium and Slovakia, too, have expressed concern about their own ability to meet the 10-year spending goal. Three years into the war in
Ukraine, the European Union’s 27 member states now spend some €340 billion a year on defense — about 1.8% of the bloc’s GDP, or less than NATO’s 2% target. Still, there are signs that Europeans finally understand that they need to invest more heavily in their own defense. The European Commission has
loosened its fiscal rules and established a potentially promising new mechanism to help nations boost their defense spending and build a robust European defense industrial base: the Security Action for Europe, or SAFE. Under the new regulation, the
EU is offering member states up to €150 billion in loans for urgent defense investments. The commission has also stipulated that the share of loans awarded to the three largest recipients must not exceed 60% of the total maximum financial aid to avoid over concentrating defense assets. “This €150 billion instrument is
not merely a funding mechanism, but a strategic tool for reshaping the defense industry landscape, prioritizing European entities, and reducing dependence on third- country suppliers,” concludes a report from consulting firm Bird & Bird. Germany, too, traditionally
Europe’s strongest economy and a major military spender, has taken dramatic steps to boost its defense sector.
Berlin has raised its core defense
budget from $101 billion to $179 billion for 2029 — a bigger increase than last year’s combined defense spending of all Bucharest Nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe. “The 5% is a huge headline
number, but it doesn’t reflect reality,” said Ian Bremmer, who heads the Eurasia Group, a global consulting firm. “Countries will add all sorts of nondefense spending to make it appear they’re reaching their target.” Stephen Sestanovich, a fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations, shares Bremmer’s concern that European defense ministers will try to “bend the rules for what counts as a defense-related outlay.” Even so, he adds, suspicion of the
U.S. will continue to grow, which is also likely to boost Europe’s defense spending. “You can assume the Europeans
will stick to their commitments with just about the same level of diligence, trust, consistency, and the likelihood of execution as Trump displays vis- à-vis allies,” French defense analyst Francois Heisbourg wrote in an email, reflecting widespread euroskepticism both about U.S. policy and Europe’s ability to meet the 5% target. Winning public support for increased defense spending will also be challenging, especially given the unpopularity of governments in the U.K., France, and other European democracies and the rise of far-right and far-left political parties through- out the European Union. Even if the money can be found,
cautions Kathleen McInnis, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, “throwing money at problems is rarely, in itself, sufficient.”
Translating more money into capability is the real challenge — “one that is going to require a serious mindset shift across the NATO alliance.” Europe’s traditional, sclerotic
methods of defense procurement must be replaced by rapid acquisition processes that prioritize “delivering weapons and real capabilities to warfighters.” Decades of neglect after the
Cold War have depleted personnel and equipment levels. So, Europe will require sustained higher levels of funding and a more resilient defense-industrial base to repair the damage for years to come. Another weakness of the target
is the lack of explicit sanctions or punishment for noncompliance. Currently, defense deadbeats will
face only diplomatic pressure and public scolding from the U.S. and other European countries for failing to pay their share. In the meantime, Russia continues its massive attacks on Ukraine, despite Western sanctions, soaring casualties, and high inflation at home. The head of Germany’s Bundeswehr, its armed forces, recently estimated that Russia would be ready to wage another large-scale European war by 2029. “The major problem with the
pledge is not that the 5% of GDP target is too ambitious or impossible to reach,” said Anna Wieslander, the Atlantic Council’s director for Northern Europe. “Rather, the risk is that by 2035 it will be too late.”
Judith Miller is a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative reporter and an expert on U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East.
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