When Ernesto Bertarelli’s (left) new sailing team Alinghi won the America’s Cup for the first time in New Zealand in 2003 it was at the end of six months that proved tougher ashore than afloat. After the 2000 Match Bertarelli hired Russell Coutts and his core team away from Team NZ, but what is often overlooked is that other wealthy Cup newcomers were busy doing the same thing. The ex-TNZ sailors had a particularly hard time of it ashore and were glad to leave the country once the job was done. In the 2003 Match Alinghi came up against a Team NZ that, without Coutts and without Peter Blake as CEO, had unravelled in a brutal defeat which saw the defenders suffer a near-sinking, a dismasting and multiple gear failures before their long nightmare was finally over
trailing car could produce. No longer could the trailing car rely on the wake of the leading car to accelerate him ahead. Because he couldn’t follow as closely through the corners he
would find himself too far behind to catch and pass the leading car in the available length of the average straight. That was only possible on very long straights preceded by a very slow or series of very slow corners through which, due to the reduced effect of aerodynamics at very slow speeds, the trailing car could follow more closely. The answer to this problem was DRS. By reducing the downforce
acting on the rear wing drag was greatly reduced for the trailing car. Induced drag for a wing at a constant angle of attack varies as the square of velocity and so rapidly rises with increases in speed, but that drag due to downforce also varies as the square of lift. By dumping that lift on the trailing car its drag goes down while the drag on the car ahead remains as it was before, giving an advantage back to the trailing car. Much the same sequence of events applies to match racing in
closely through a corner or series of corners and be in a good position either to slipstream and be sucked along by the wake from the car in front, or to outbrake the leading car into the next corner. The car behind thus had an advantage over the car in front and
as one car overtook another that advantage would change and the car that was leading became the trailing car and could now attack the one now in front. On a good slipstreaming circuit such as Monza the lead would constantly change between cars and drivers of similar performance and the trick would be to leave your last move so close to the finish line that the other car or cars could not have time to attack and regain the lead. Those most certainly were the days and race results were deter-
mined on the racetrack, largely by the relative speeds of the cars and drivers, not by pitstop strategy and tyre degradation. And then came downforce. In 1956 a Swiss engineer, Michael
May, fitted an inverted wing, the force of which acted downwards through the longitudinal centre of gravity (LCG) of his Porsche Spyder, and downforce was invented. Unfortunately for May the scrutineers deemed it illegal and so it never raced but the idea resurfaced in 1966 when Jim Hall created the Chaparral 2E Can Am car and since then motor racing has never been the same. As downforce effectively increases the weight on the tyres and
thus the grip that they produce without the extra centrifugal force, which would otherwise nullify or even exceed that extra grip, corner speeds increase dramatically. The fact that you have to pay for any sort of aerodynamic force with extra drag didn’t seem to matter too much, except on the fastest tracks. The extra corner speed was carried by the car most of the way down the next straight until terminal velocity was reached and it was only on tracks with long straights such as Monza that drag became as important as down- force and a compromise between drag and downforce was required. Power became very important on any circuit because more power
enabled you to run more downforce so that corner speed went up but, as the extra power equalled or overcame the extra drag, straight- line speed was not compromised. Now things on the track changed. No longer did the trailing car
have a big advantage over the car in front because, as it got closer, the wake from the leading car, which had previously reduced the drag on the trailing car, now also reduced the downforce that the
sailboats. When match racing was conducted in boats that sailed more slowly than the wind upwind the leading boat cast a wind shadow on the trailing boat which slowed the trailing boat down and, provided the leading boat didn’t make a mistake, a well-sailed slower boat could hold a faster boat at bay. However, downwind the situation changed and the trailing boat
now cast its wind shadow on the leading boat and, although difficult to pass a well-sailed boat, it was possible. All the advantages were now with the trailing boat. So we had a situation that gave the advantage to one boat on
the beat and the other on the run and the racing could be very close between two well-matched boats and crew. Perhaps the best example of this situation in an America’s Cup
context is the successful Intrepid defence of 1970, when skipper Bill Ficker, tactician Steve van Dyke and a well-practised American crew held off the Alan Payne-designed Australian Challenger Gretel II, generally recognised as being the faster yacht. Now, however, with boats, in particular America’s Cup AC75s,
that sail faster than the wind that agreeable state of affairs no longer exists. The leading boat will always cast its wind shadow on the trailing boat, both upwind and down. It is now almost impossible for the trailing boat to pass a well-sailed leading boat that always covers and doesn’t go out on a limb. Even if it’s inherently faster, unless the leading boat makes a mistake the trailing boat will not pass. In Auckland last spring ‘New Zealand’ was faster than ‘Luna
Rossa’ but still the only way it could win was to win the start or rely on Luna Rossa making a mistake, sailing into a hole or not covering. This is exactly how every race transpired. Next time those mistakes will be fewer. Although boats that sail fast are exciting, if the result of the race
is predetermined by who wins the start it is no longer an exciting or watchable race. There are two solutions. Either go back to a class of boat that
sails more slowly than the wind, and rely on the tactics and close- ness of the racing to generate excitement and the desire to watch; or stay with boats that sail faster than the wind, in which case some way has to be engineered to give the advantage to the trailing boat on the run, in much the same way that DRS gives the advantage to the trailing car. Perhaps the leading boat has to shorten sail within a given time of rounding the windward mark? Just an idea. It’s not an easy problem to solve and only matters in a match race
such as the America’s Cup. In fleet racing it is impossible for the leader to cover the whole fleet and is not therefore a problem in, say, foiling Moth races. But in a one-on-one match race it most certainly is.
SEAHORSE 15
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