Training & simulation
Like the Baltic nations before them, Taiwan’s best hope is to draw out any conflict for as long as possible, and play for time to enable foreign military support to come from the US and its allies. Fortunately, due to its natural geography, any attempted invasion of Taiwan would be no easy scenario. “You’re looking at a Normandy-like distance, just like 1944, which was immensely challenging,” Harper notes.
Fearing an emboldened China seeking to annex Taiwan by force, Taipei has ramped up military recruitment.
As a result, one way in which the US can help
Taiwanese forces work around this issue is by taking their soldiers off-island to train in the US and over with its partners – such as Australia, Japan and the UK. Similarly, the US and its partners have extensive facilities in the Indo-Pacific where they could train units, says Harper, which would be less likely to ruffle China’s feathers. International cooperation, however, is key. “That’s the success in the Baltic and Ukrainian cases – it takes a village,” he adds. “We don’t gain as America by just doing everything ourselves – we’re always best when we’re integrated with all our different allies and partners.
170,000
The size, in personnel, of Taiwan’s active military force in 2023.
Global Firepower 20
China and Russia What’s imperative, however, is that Taiwan acts decisively in terms of restructuring its military – time is very much of the essence when it comes to the looming threat of a potential Chinese invasion. “There are obviously multiple dates out there,” notes Harper, referring to Admiral Davidson’s warnings of a Chinese invasion by 2027. “You have 2027, 2035 [and so on]. The PRC is certainly expanding its [military] capabilities, and reunification with Taiwan is definitely an option.” With China’s expansionist ambitions on the immediate horizon, Taiwan needs to follow Ukraine’s example, carrying out both quick short-term changes and longer-term efforts simultaneously to maximise its deterrence capabilities. “Taiwan is highly unlikely to win a knock-down, drawn-out, one-on-one fight with the PRC on their own. The odds aren’t in their favour – but they can be a porcupine,” explains Harper. “You want to make such a military action as costly as possible for the PRC so that they’ll veer off and pursue other measures. That’s definitely in Taiwan’s benefit, but it’s also in the entire world’s benefit given its strategic location.”
The world has just seen what happens when a more powerful nation fails to accurately take stock of an opponent’s capabilities before launching an invasion. “Vladimir Putin clearly overestimated the ability of his forces to achieve their goals – but Xi is not Putin,” says Harper. “However, that makes it even more of a driver for him to make sure that he understands the capability of his forces to achieve his objectives.” While China has not been at war since the 1979 conflict against Vietnam – which was tremendously costly for both sides – much of how the nation has reorganised its own military has been based on observations on recent conflicts, from the Gulf War in 1990–91, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and so on. Ukraine is just the latest in a long line of lessons. Unlike Russia, however, China doesn’t have the option of simply driving into Ukraine – its forces have to cross 100 miles of water, which presents a far greater challenge in logistical terms. “It’s not just a sea problem, it’s also a land and air problem,” Harper adds. “Today, unlike World War Two, it’s a cyber challenge, it’s a space challenge too.” Similarly, China will have taken note of the immense, immediate effect that a relatively small amount of Western hardware was able to have on the Ukrainian battlefield – particularly US equipment. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not this will aid long-term deterrence. Technologies that at the beginning of the Ukraine war seemed like game changers, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and underseas vehicles, have since fallen from grace. The Bayraktar TB2 drone, once hailed as the saviour of Ukraine, today has been relegated to essentially a recon-only role. For Taiwan, then, the takeaway is to keep its focus on security force assistance and building partner capacity. While some high profile US military partnerships have failed in the past, Taiwan’s only hope is to aim for success. “Prior to the kick-off of the Ukraine war, […] we’d had engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we had tried to train partner militaries. We could argue the point of why for days, but clearly they weren’t as successful as we wanted them to be,” concedes Harper. “But then we’ve seen Ukraine and the Baltics stand strong as alternatives examples.” All Taiwan needs is the will – and the time – to make it work. ●
Dr Harper’s views are his own and do not represent those of the US Army War College, the US Army or the Department of Defense.
Defence & Security Systems International /
www.defence-and-security.com
JENG BO YUAN/
Shutterstock.com
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49
