Training & simulation
Baltic nations’ small territories, they were unlikely to defeat Russia in any kind of direct conflict. Instead, they would have to be more effective than their Russian counterparts, focusing on maximising lethality with small numbers. To achieve this, the Baltics committed to the concept of joint training with the US and their other Nato allies. This was achieved through a number of methods; for one, multinational Nato forces were permanently stationed in each of the Baltic states and in neighbouring Poland, where they were continuously exposed to a series of rotational training exercises aimed at instilling the professional practices most desired by the respective militaries. “Ukraine was a different story,” notes Harper. “They were more resistant to change.” While the Baltics started rebuilding their military back in the 90s, Ukraine only really got going in 2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea. That year, the Ukrainian government launched an in-depth review of its national security and military defence, which identified a number of issues that had led to their military’s poor combat performance. At the same time, the US greatly increased financial aid to Ukraine, providing a total of $2.7bn in training and equipment by the end of 2021.
Ukraine benefitted from having its Baltic neighbours around to offer their cooperation with security personnel – they were newer Nato members, rather than long-established parties, and therefore less objectionable to both Nato sceptics and the ever-watching Russians. Ukrainian troops were rotated through the Yavoriv centre in the Lviv region of western Ukraine – supported by US trainers, British and Canadian troops worked with individual units’ combat training back at their home stations. “There were multiple approaches [aimed at] hitting Ukraine’s tactical units at multiple levels so that they were focused on warfighting skills,” says Harper, noting the importance of introducing new tactics from the bottom up. “It’s not just that they were going to go out to the range and shoot, they were going through actual realistic warfighting exercises.” Beyond this lower-level tactical proficiency, the US and Nato looked to improve Ukraine’s strategic and operational proficiency. Unlike the Baltic nations, Ukraine already had its defence infrastructure in place, making the process of transforming it from the top down a far more difficult project – but progress was starting to be made by the time the invasion began. “Just prior to the start of the current invasion, they were starting to allow us into some of their command posts,” Harper notes.
State of play Taiwan, however, is in a wholly different situation than Ukraine and the Baltics – but not necessarily in a good way. “[Taiwan’s situation] is much more
difficult, for several reasons,” says Harper. For one, Ukraine and the Baltic states are in Europe, where most of Nato’s members reside. European, US and Canadian forces are already stationed across the continent, so they can be connected quickly when conflict breaks out. It’s also worth noting that the Baltic nations were already Nato members when their military build-up began, while Ukraine was a partner of Nato’s Partnership for Peace programme. Taiwan, on the other hand, is not an officially recognised country in the eyes of the US government, and no diplomatic relations exist between the two entities – though, of course, there is a robust unofficial relationship. It’s certainly not in any kind of partnership with Nato, and this poses challenges when looking to develop multinational training efforts. “There are political nuances that are extremely charged,” notes Harper in relation to Taiwan’s status. “You need to work through the ability to authorise the US and other allies to partner with Taiwanese forces to train in our countries.”
While Russia was far from welcoming when it came to allowing Nato forces to enter and train on Ukrainian soil, it looks positively hospitable compared with China’s hostility against foreign actors entering Taiwan, as seen with then-Secretary Pelosi’s visit last year. “We have to be very careful about the amount of forces that we would put on the ground in Taiwan because it’s extremely politically sensitive with the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” Harper notes, calling the Chinese government “prickly” on this issue. Another challenge for Taiwan is its small size, like the Baltics. None of these boast the strategic depth that Ukraine possesses, which makes things difficult when defending against a superior opponent – you can’t really afford to cede territory with the goal of falling back to a more defensible position. That same lack of space is an issue when organising multinational training efforts. “Taiwan is a mountainous, urbanised country – there’s not a lot of space to train there,” says Harper.
Defence & Security Systems International /
www.defence-and-security.com
Despite enjoying robust informal relations, Taiwan’s lack of formal recognition by the US places it in a precarious position.
60-70,000
The annual increase in recruitment for Taiwan’s military by 2027 due to the new year- long conscription requirement.
National Policy Foundation 19
Ivan Marc/
Shutterstock.com
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