search.noResults

search.searching

saml.title
dataCollection.invalidEmail
note.createNoteMessage

search.noResults

search.searching

orderForm.title

orderForm.productCode
orderForm.description
orderForm.quantity
orderForm.itemPrice
orderForm.price
orderForm.totalPrice
orderForm.deliveryDetails.billingAddress
orderForm.deliveryDetails.deliveryAddress
orderForm.noItems
THE AGENDA Wealth


Annamaria Koerling


The investing landscape has changed signifi cantly over the past 15 years – but has it adapted enough to avoid another crash?


I


n 2006 an IMF report noted that, as volatility across a wide range of assets fell to generational lows, investors were taking on more risk as they went in search of yield and returns. The report cautioned that ‘investors appear to be giving


insuffi cient weight to downside risks and might assume that the low-risk premia are a permanent feature of the fi nancial market landscape’. It turned out to be right. I was thinking about this report recently as I refl ected on the


15th anniversary of this magazine, and I couldn’t help but feel a sense of déjà vu. 2006 was the year everything started to go wrong. Poor affordability, an oversupply of homes, and 17 interest rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve saw US house prices start to slide. This fi nally caught the attention of global investors in 2007, as sub- prime borrowers struggled to refi nance their loans and started to default. This, in turn, triggered the worst crisis since the Great Depression as ripple effects were felt around the world and amplifi ed by leverage. After a major fi nancial crisis, it takes time for things to return to normal – a decade or so, according to a study by Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart. Although the GFC fi nally ended in 2009 after massive monetary and fi scal stimulus, along with government rescues of banks, the aftershocks were felt for the next decade with sub-par growth and low infl ation. The GFC also resulted in a fundamental


re-evaluation of risk and a wave of regulatory reforms designed to shore up banks’ balance sheets and protect economies and investors from future excesses. New regulations around the world introduced the idea of a duty of care towards investors and shifted the emphasis from a prescriptive set of rules to a code of ethics promoting a culture of ‘doing the right thing’. Looking back, the end of the GFC marked a new chapter in


use of more regulated investment vehicles in jurisdictions such as Luxembourg and Jersey. We have also seen a new form of investing emerge in the form of


smart beta – passive strategies that seek to control risk by weighting allocations according to a range of factors. More recently, there has also been dramatic growth in vehicles aligned with ESG principles and themes. It’s also 15 years since Al Gore’s fi lm An Inconvenient Truth was released and the Financial Times wrote that 2006 ‘could go down as the year in which global warming fi nally became a signifi cant popular issue across the western world’. Today’s informed investor is blessed with more tools in their toolkit, better information and generally lower costs. They are also likely to feel overwhelmed with choice. A new dilemma has emerged, which the Germans refer to as the Qual der Wahl, the torment of choice. How do you decide and differentiate? Fifteen years ago, investors did not need


Are we in danger of making the same mistakes


investors made in 2006 by investing in over-engineered solutions?


investing. Risk was redefi ned, with a move away from the traditional focus on volatility and a greater focus on the maximum loss that investors were willing to tolerate in a given year. There was a recognition that better returns and better risk control would require a new approach to asset allocation, greater transparency and different, more regulated, investment vehicles. The past decade has seen exponential growth in new investment vehicles and approaches designed to meet this need. We have seen the rise of exchange traded funds, which offer the ability to invest by risk factor or theme. Many hedge fund managers now offer more liquid strategies, and private equity managers are making extensive


to take excessive risk to achieve decent returns, but many did in the hope that it would either give them better returns or protect them on the downside. In 2006, if you wanted to build a portfolio capable of producing a 7.5 per cent return, you didn’t need to stray too far away from developed market equities and investment grade bonds. Today, an investor with the same ambitions will need to contemplate a more complex, less liquid and riskier portfolio. Modern portfolios may need to have up to half in illiquid asset classes such as private equity, private credit and real


estate, and no more than a quarter in the traditional asset classes of investment grade bonds and developed market equities. This raises a question: will our expanded toolkit of investments – this so called new ‘intelligent’ diversifi cation – provide better protection against the next crisis? Or are we in danger of making the same mistakes investors made in 2006 by investing in over-engineered solutions? As we face a new crisis, in the form of the pandemic, it could be easy to convince oneself that ‘it will be different this time’. But history has a knack of repeating itself. Manias, panics and crashes, as Charles Kindleberger’s classic tome reminds us, can be relied on to crop up time and again. Just as with Covid-19, perfect inoculation from the fi nancial consequences is not possible. But mitigation – in the form of due diligence, a healthy dose of scepticism and a broad mix of assets – may be more important now than ever before. S Annamaria Koerling is managing partner of Delfin Private Office


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96  |  Page 97  |  Page 98  |  Page 99  |  Page 100