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Market forces |


Jeremy Wilcox is managing director of the Energy Partnership, an independent Thailand-based energy and environment consulting firm 8/27 Sukhumvit Soi 8, Klongtoey, Bangkok 10110, Thailand | T: +66 2 653 1263 | Mobile: +66 860993375 | S: energypartnership


The rising importance of LNG


In March the UK government published its second Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (REMA) consultation, through which it is seeking views on specific proposals. The consultation presents two proposals: the transition from system to locational pricing and an increase in gas-fired capacity. There have been growing concerns that system marginal pricing, whereby the most expensive resource in the generation stack sets the price for all generation resources across the country, does not reflect the growing generation share of renewable resources. And with gas almost always the most expensive generation resource electricity prices have largely tracked gas. A move to locational pricing could remove some of the pricing sensitivity to gas, although this would depend on the locational boundaries employed, but the main benefit of locational pricing is the investment signals provided. As there are grid limitations to the amount of electrical power that can be transferred from one grid node to another (transmission constraints) and costs associated with electricity transmission (grid losses), the location is an important factor for electricity price determination. The optimal electricity price, which is known as the Locational Marginal Price (LMP), is determined at each node of the grid, as the price equilibrium between supply and demand at the node. The marginal transmission cost between two nodes is the difference in the cost of generation at these nodes. With such prices, a generator will produce if its short-run marginal cost plus the transmission price is lower than the cost of generation at the destination node. If the transmission capacity was unlimited between all grid nodes and there were no grid losses, the price would be equal for all nodes. Nodal market design corresponds to the determination of an LMP at each node of the electricity transmission grid while zonal market clearing prices (MCP) are calculated for the geographical area known as the bidding zone which comprises numerous transmission nodes between which capacity limits are neglected. For the price determination, each bidding zone in the zonal model is equivalent to a node in the nodal model as only transmission capacities between bidding zones are considered for the MCP calculation. This leads to different paradigms for congestion management. In the nodal model, all potential congestions are considered by design for price determination leading to LMP differences between nodes in case of congestion.


If a nodal market is developed it would likely lead to the development of a financial transmissions rights (FTR) market, which is a method to bypass congestion charges associated with LMP as they give market participants the ability to attain a better price certainty when delivering energy across the grid. FTRs allow market participants to offset (hedge) potential losses related to the price risk of delivering energy to the grid. FTRs are a financial contract entitling the FTR holder to a stream of revenues (or charges) based on the day-ahead hourly congestion price difference across an energy path.


FTRs are worth the economic value determined by the day-ahead hourly congestion prices. The FTR serves as a benefit, or credit, to the holder if it represents a flow of energy in the same direction as the congested flow. The FTR serves as a liability, or charge, to the holder if it represents a flow of energy in the opposite direction to the congested flow. While the government’s communication on locational pricing rightly focuses on the potential for lower prices, which is its main selling proposition to a public that has suffered soaring energy prices while some generating companies have reaped windfall profits, and particularly wind generators, the real benefit should be the potential for increased market efficiency through aligning prices with smaller geographical areas. But it is difficult to see market pricing being dislocated from gas unless Britain’s power market is priced out at each individual node, with around 850 nodes in Britain’ system, as opposed to zonal locational pricing, that would aggregate nodes into seven zones that broadly align with transmission zones. Indeed, with the REMA consultation also proposing new investment in gas-fired power generation a zonal market would almost certainly maintain gas as a proxy for power prices.


The government reasons that increasing gas capacity will be pivotal to achieving


decarbonisation and net zero goals, much to the chagrin of the renewable lobby, yet the government has little choice owing to decarbonisation increasing electricity demand, a renewable strategy that is over-reliant on intermittent wind, an aged nuclear fleet that is increasingly subject to unplanned outages, and a nuclear investment strategy that is heavy on aspiration yet weak on delivery. A more balanced and competitive renewable portfolio, and a competitive nuclear market would have provided a more sustainable generation market approach, and particularly for a country that once aspired to lead the world along the path toward competitive, affordable, and sustainable power markets. The share of gas-fired generation in Britain has progressively fallen over the past three years with gas providing 21.2% of production in 2021, 20.5% in 2022, 18.3% in 2032 and 16.9% in the first quarter of 2024 although this reduced dependence has partly been a function of falling overall generation, which fell 12% y-o-y in 2023 and is 1.4% lower q-o-q in 2024, as well as rising imports as new interconnections were commissioned. The 1.4 GW North Sea Link with Norway became operational in 2021 and the 1.4 GW Viking Link with Denmark went into operation at the end of 2023, with imports typically meeting around 20% of electricity demand.


While the government’s proposals address the need for better investment signals in generation, and could provide a safety net to support its decarbonisation and net zero strategy, an increasing reliance on gas and the gradual depletion of North Sea reserves would also make Britain increasingly reliant on LNG imports if planned investment in hydrogen slows. One of the aims of market competition was to reduce the impact of oil prices on gas by promoting gas-on-gas competition. The irony is that decarbonisation will raise LNG demand and, as LNG cargoes are indexed to oil, also increase the influence of oil on gas and power prices.


One of the aims of … competition was to reduce the impact of oil prices on gas … the irony is that decarbonisation will raise LNG demand and, as LNG cargoes are indexed to oil … increase the influence of oil on gas and power prices.


10 | April 2024 | www.modernpowersystems.com


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