ADVERTORIAL SMARTER POLICING: FAIR FINES,
THE CASE FOR INCOME-BASED PENALTIES IN OUT-OF-COURT RESOLUTIONS
By Andy Bartlett, AdventFS LTD
As police forces across the UK face increasing demands and diminishing resources, the need for proportionate, efficient responses to low-level offending has never been greater. However, some entities continue to resist the implementation of an offender pays model, this may in part lie in a failed experiment modelled on the German system, known as Tagessätze, which assigns a number of daily units for the offence (between 5 and 360) and multiplies them by the offender’s net daily income. For example, a fine for shoplifting might be 30 units at €30/ day for a low-income offender, or €100/ day for a high earner making the penalty equally impactful. The “day-fine” model, most notably used in Germany, Sweden, and Finland, determines financial penalties based on two factors: the seriousness of the offence and the offender’s daily disposable income (Kilchling, 2005). This ensures that the fine has equivalent punitive weight regardless of socioeconomic status. Germany saw a 90% drop in short
custodial sentences in the decade after implementing day-fines (Kilchling, 2005), showing how financial penalties, when proportionate and enforced, can effectively replace court-based
sanctions. In Finland, a 2024 study by Kaila used regression-discontinuity analysis to evaluate the deterrent effect of income-based speeding fines. The study found that a €200 increase in fine (linked to income) led to a 15% reduction in reoffending within six months, highlighting the potential of tailored penalties to change behaviour. The United Kingdom’s brief trial of income-linked fines from 1991 to 1993 failed, primarily due to inadequate implementation and adverse media coverage. Notable cases where substantial fines were imposed on affluent offenders were portrayed as unreasonable and inequitable, prompting a political withdrawal. Furthermore, lay magistrates, who were uneasy with the rigidity of formulaic sentencing, favored the discretion and straightforwardness offered by traditional flat fines (Sanders & Young, 2000). However, the research from the United Kingdoms attempt to implement a similar model did highlight that Proportional fines may be more successfully deployed outside the courtroom, where flexibility, discretion, and victim collaboration are more available than the rigid court structure. One underexplored solution lies in the adoption of income-based financial
DIVERSION MANAGER SUPPORTS Offender Pays Model for OoCRs
Many forces are turning to an OoCR model requiring the offender to pay for their rehabilitation addressing the underlying causes of offending behaviour while not only punishing but also rehabilitating. This model also alleviates pressures in the criminal justice system and reduces back logs of cases. The Diversion Manager platform manages it all from end-to-end. Learn more at
DiversionManager.co.uk.
penalties within out-of-court resolution (OoCR) frameworks. Inspired by continental Europe’s “day-fine” systems, this approach can alleviate burdens on frontline officers, promote equity, and reduce unnecessary prosecutions if implemented with care. UK police forces are under acute strain from increased case complexity, court backlogs, and staff shortages. The pressure to divert suitable cases out of the formal system is growing. The College of Policing has emphasised the value of community resolutions and conditional cautions, particularly for first-time and low-level offenders, yet many forces still wrangle with the concept that the offender should either pay for the intervention or contribute towards compensating the victim.
DiversionManager.co.uk 46 | POLICE | AUGUST | 2025
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