contacting Mr. Sorenson via voice and text satellite communications, the crew elected to return to California. Mr. Sorenson instructed them to divert to Merced Airport, California, for inspection, repair, or modification. There, Tom Lopes of Gateway Air Center modified the system by installing 2 transfer pumps per his communications with Mr. Sorenson. During a ground run after the ferry system was modified, a line to a transfer pump began to leak, so the crew shut down the airplane. Mr. Johansson cancelled the mission for that day because he wanted the whole ferry system defueled and inspected again, and for all parties involved to rest and re- approach the issue on the same page with clear communication. Mr. Sorenson arrived on site by November 5th and worked all day directly with Pilatus technicians through multiple phone and email exchanges. There was now a better understanding of the fuel system which contrary to Mr. Sorenson’s initial description to the pilots, required 25 PSI to open a check valve and fed directly to the engine feed line, not the left main tank. The crew had a successful ground test of the system and Mr. Sorenson advised them that all existing paperwork was sufficient to include the modification made. No new approvals were required, and the aircraft was airworthy according to Mr. Sorenson.
On November 6, once the airplane was returned to service, they flew from Merced to SMX and tested the ferry fuel transfer process with both the front and rear internal tanks and both transfer pumps up to an altitude of 17,500 ft. The system worked properly. They refueled at SMX and departed for Hawaii about 1000.
During the ocean crossing flight, the internal transfer system worked well. Mr. Johansson and Ms. Michaels followed the checklist and guidance provided by the ferry system installer. They burned off the main tanks from full (402 gallons) down to 300 gallons, then activated the ferry system transfer process. The internal ferry fuel was plumbed to the Pilatus factory fitting, which directed ferry fuel directly to the engine. Fuel is sent to the engine in excess of what the engine requires. All unused fuel is returned to the main tanks. They did get a “FUEL IMBALANCE” caution light occasionally, but that was expected as excess transfer fuel was sent back to the main tanks after passing through the engine. Ms. Michaels managed the internal fuel tank operation in the cabin area. Successful transfer was demonstrated from the front and rear tanks with each transfer pump.
About 3.5 to 4 hours into the flight, the airplane was light enough to climb from FL 200 to FL 280. The rear internal tank had reached almost empty and they planned to get it as low as possible without porting air into the fuel system. The new NGX model did not have a fuel/air separator in the system. They needed to use all of the usable fuel for the long 10 hour flight, and the ferry system was designed to use “all” of the fuel and approval instructions were to deplete ferry fuel from the cabin as soon as possible. They picked up a tailwind and were right on schedule with their flight planning per oceanic planning cross
checks. They used calculations to time the end use of the rear fuel tank. The tanks were aluminum, and the fuel level sight gages were difficult to read. Ms. Michaels used a flashlight to watch the fuel in a clear tube line to the bulkhead connection to make sure it was filled with fuel, and she shut off the transfer process before the rear tank fuel was exhausted. About 5 or 10 or 20 seconds after that, (Mr. Johansson wasn’t sure exactly how much time passed) the CAS “FUEL LOW PRESSURE” light illuminated. He had already placed the IGNITION switch to on during the ferry transfer, and now set the two aircraft BOOST PUMPs to the “ON” position for the end of transfer process. He instantly confirmed the pumps were ON with the two green “PUMP PUMP” CAS message and green “IGNITION” messages. About 5 seconds after the low pressure light illuminated, the engine surged and then completely shut down and feathered. He commenced a rapid emergency descent because they were losing pressurization. Ms. Michaels came back to the cockpit and they commenced the emergency checklist for Engine Failure In Flight from the POH.
He and Ms. Michaels used the checklist to perform an air start. The engine started and the propeller unfeathered; however, the engine never reached idle rpm and manipulation of the power control lever did not affect the engine. The engine would not fully start. The crew shut off the engine per the checklist and they attempted another air start. During the next start sequence, the engine made a loud grinding noise and then a loud catastrophic “bang.” There was no evidence of smoke or flames from the exhaust on either side of the aircraft. The CAS panel lit up. At some point, the EPECS FAIL light illuminated, but he could not recall exactly when. As the airplane descended, they attempted multiple air starts, including the procedures for an EPECS FAIL light on. The propeller never moved, and the engine never started. About 8,000 ft, they committed to ditching the airplane and they commenced the ditching checklist.
Mr. Johansson and Ms. Michaels each, one at a time, went to the back of the airplane to prepare the survival gear. They each donned a life vest. They had a 6 man raft onboard that he was delivering to Pilatus Australia, and they prepared it for deployment. He made mayday calls on the VHF radio because the HF radio was not powered without the generator. He spoke with an Alaska Airlines crew on guard (121.5) frequency and provided a position for ditching.
Survival, Search and Rescue 10
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