motive flow line would flow out the delivery ejector pumps’ inlet because the delivery ejector pumps’ flap valve was closed.
It is possible that the loss of engine power was due to air being introduced into the fuel line from the ferry system, although the boost pumps, if operating properly, should have compressed the air and forced it through the fuel line. It is also possible that ice built up in the aircraft fuel tanks during the fuel transfer operations, and when the ferry system was turned OFF, fuel flow to the engine stopped or was restricted because 1) the left- and right-wing fuel was too viscous; and/or 2) the ejector flap valves were stuck closed.
The aircraft was certified without an air separator in the engine fuel feed line. In addition, the production fuel system design of the accident airplane was such that a Fuel System Icing Inhibitor (FSII) was not required. Although not required, neither the aircraft manufacturer nor the company that installed the ferry fuel system evaluated 1) the ferry system’s impact on the production fuel system operating temperature; 2) if an FSII should be required; and 3) if not having an air separator in the engine fuel feed line would impact the system.
The loss of engine power likely was caused by fuel starvation as a result of 1) air in the fuel line from operating on the ferry fuel system; or 2) a build-up of ice in the production fuel system due to operating on the ferry fuel system. However, because the airplane was lost at sea and was not available for post accident examination, the exact cause of the fuel starvation could not be determined.
Narrative:Mr. Johansson was the pilot-in-command during the PC-12 ditching in the Pacific Ocean that occurred on November 6, 2020. He was interviewed by telephone. This is a summary of his statements. Mr. Johansson provided a description of his aviation background that included time as a flight instructor and a ferry pilot. He enjoyed the challenges of flying different airplanes to different areas and all the regulatory research and compliance that was required. He learned to respect safety and technical knowledge after a frightening first solo flight experience when he was a teenager. He did most of his advanced flight training at American Flyers in California, where he met Kelly Michaels (the copilot). He began his Johansson Aviation LLC ferry service company in 2014. He also attended college at that time. He began flying for PSA airlines as a first officer in 2018 and obtained FAR part 121 flight experience. He appreciated the great level of training and crew resource management. In early 2020 he was furloughed from the company due to the Covid 19 economy.
In mid-2020, he was hired to ferry the PC-12 from California to Australia by the airplane’s new owner. Mr. Johansson had ferried an SR-22 for the owner before and it went very well. Mr. Johansson asked pilot Kelly Michaels to fly with him because she was an excellent pilot with much PC-12 time and was very technically proficient. They attended PC- 12 NGX training at Simcom Aviation in Arizona, which included 5 days and 20 hours of simulator training. He and Ms. Michaels ran through all the normal and emergency checklist per the SIMCOM syllabus, including multiple air starts, overweight takeoff and performance operations and a water ditching per their request. The simulator was a static model. One CAS message and emergency that was not covered was the EPECS FAIL procedures, which in hindsight he wished they had done. Following approval by the aircraft owner and aircraft manufacturer, Pilatus, Mr. Johansson also contracted Mr. Fred Sorenson of Flight Contract Services at the North Las Vegas Airport to engineer, approve, and install an internal ferry fuel system for the journey. Mr. Sorenson was recommended by various pilots in the ferry industry.
Mr. Johansson and Ms. Michaels first flew the accident airplane first from McMinnville, Oregon, to Hillsboro Airport, Oregon, where Aero Air, a Pilatus approved repair station modified a fuel pump in accordance with an airworthiness directive (AD). Following the maintenance, the crew was to reposition from Hillsboro to North Las Vegas airport. During that flight on October 6th, they had a right fuel quantity fault indication, which could not be duplicated on the ground. The aircraft was approved by Aero Air to continue to North Las Vegas. Later that evening they flew to North Las Vegas Airport where the ferry fuel system was to be installed. The right fuel quantity indicator fault occurred again, and a Pilatus approved technician fixed that in Las Vegas. Mr. Sorenson described the first ferry system installed to have two tanks with valves that fed the left main fuel tank. Mr. Sorenson provided a checklist for use and operating guidance. Mr. Sorenson stated that all the required FAA paperwork was done. Mr. Johansson understood that Pilatus and the airplane owner were also involved in the design or approval of the installed system.
On November 1 they repositioned the airplane to Santa Maria Airport (SMX). During that leg, they could not transfer any fuel from the ferry tanks to the main tanks per their ferry transfer check procedures, so they contacted Mr. Sorenson by phone upon landing at SMX. He ensured them that the system would work if they disable the main boost pumps during ferry transfers by pulling the two boost pump circuit breakers. The following morning on November 2 they departed for Hilo Airport (PHTO) and performed the ferry system check which still did not satisfy the pilots. After
9 Survival, Search and Rescue
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