search.noResults

search.searching

dataCollection.invalidEmail
note.createNoteMessage

search.noResults

search.searching

orderForm.title

orderForm.productCode
orderForm.description
orderForm.quantity
orderForm.itemPrice
orderForm.price
orderForm.totalPrice
orderForm.deliveryDetails.billingAddress
orderForm.deliveryDetails.deliveryAddress
orderForm.noItems
By Randy Mains WHY I DO WHAT I DO? “WHY DO YOU DO WHAT YOU DO?”


That’s a question Rick Weatherford, copy editor and staff writer for Rotorcraft Pro, asked me recently. Rick casts a discerning editorial eye over everything I write for the magazine, so I suppose he became curious about what motivates me.


When I asked him exactly what he meant, he made his query more specific:


“Randy, what fuels your burning passion for promoting rotorcraft safety? Is it statistics, or your personal experiences? Do you believe helicopter safety is generally being addressed in the wrong way and you think you have a solution that’s been overlooked? Or is it some combination of all these issues as well as others that I didn’t allude to?”


I vividly remember the exact date and time I decided I needed to return to the USA to deliver a life-saving message. The date was August 31, 2010; the time: 10 p.m. That’s when I learned of yet another air medical crash. A Bell Jet Ranger in Arkansas went into the clouds and came out the bottom in pieces, killing the pilot and the two-person medical crew who had entrusted their lives to him.


I was in my accommodation at Abu Dhabi Aviation when I heard the news. For some reason, hearing about that crash caused me to ‘snap’ and at that moment I became an activist for change. I went for a long walk to think. During that walk the same thoughts kept racing through my mind: When will they finally ‘get it’ back home? When will the carnage end? What will it take to bring about change?


Since I flew my first helicopter air ambulance (HAA) mission at Hermann Hospital in Houston in January 1979, and as the first recipient of the Golden Hour Award for my contribution to further the HAA concept in America, I’ve always felt I had skin in the game. As a consequence I wrote my first book in 1985 entitled The Golden Hour to act as a bellwether warning that more people would die if the same attitudes and procedures continued. Sadly,


8 Jan/Feb 2018


that book proved prophetic, like gazing into a crystal ball of things to come. Since writing that book I watched an average of 13 people lose their lives annually in what seemed to be the same accident occurring over and over again: IIMC, loss of spatial orientation, then loss of control leading to loss of life. From my vantage point overseas, it appeared to be the very definition of insanity.


While working abroad I would tell the airline transport pilots I flew with how we conducted HAA operations in the States, and those pilots who hailed from more than 20 nations would look at me like I had totally lost my mind.


I’LL ANSWER RICK’S QUESTIONS ONE AT A TIME:


Is it statistics that fuels your burning passion for promoting flight safety?


The stats certainly do back up the need to address the safety issues in our industry. For example, in HAA, Dr. Ira Blumen, medical director at the University of Chicago UCAN life flight program, ran a safety improvement study with an assortment of 40-plus HAA professionals on his team. After examining HAA crashes over a 10-year period, their study came to the grim conclusion that 94 percent of the crashes had an element of human error. Similarly, in a 10-year study by the U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, it was determined that 84 percent of the crashes in general helicopter aviation had an element of human error.


Is it your personal experiences that caused you to become such a safety advocate?


Absolutely! In 1984, when I left HAA flying in San Diego, I was hired to set up a nationwide HAA program in the Sultanate of Oman. I witnessed a much safer way to fly. My new colleagues were former British military pilots accustomed to solid two-crew operations using effective crew resource management. Nearly all of them had flown hard IFR on the North Sea as well. It was similar to airline standards.


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88