Dan Kaszeta, Managing Director of Strongpoint Security, on possible lessons learned for the US Secret Service


Hammer Time I


had the privilege of working for the US Secret Service (USSS) from 2002 to 2008, and for the majority of my


time there I was a member of the Hammer team. Hammer stands for hazardous agent mitigation and medical emergency response and is the service’s tactical response to many real or suspected CBRN incidents. The technical security division


(TSD) of the USSS has long considered CBRN terrorism as part of its remit, along with other technical and environmental threats to USSS protectees. The Hammer team was developed in 1996-1997 after the 1995 Tokyo sarin attack, out of specific concern that the USSS did not have the ability to intervene promptly if a protectee was attacked with fast-acting chemical substances. Something both toxic and fast acting was also likely to affect the inner cordon of a protective detail, so there was a tactical need for a group that could safely intervene and provide life-saving support in such scenarios. Developing in scope, mission, personnel, and equipment from a modest start, Hammer grew to become a substantial part of TSD’s operational footprint, with well over 40 assigned personnel during the 2004 election campaign. The programme transitioned to the newly formed special operations division 10 years ago. The initial mission was to perform


rapid rescue, decontamination, identification, and initial medical treatment in the event of an attack with nerve agents or similar rapid acting agents. Additional elements quickly got bolted onto this initial mission. As handheld detection and identification technology developed, Hammer became responsible for assessment and decontamination of unknown substances, such as a powder thrown at a protectee or a liquid thrown onto a limousine. As all the team had quite a


good mix of training and equipment, various other tasks were grafted on. The team could work as vital backup to the White House medical unit, use their Lineback vehicle as a backup ambulance, assess radiation sources, or conduct technical rescue from a wrecked motor vehicle, for example. As a general rule, Hammer mostly


supported presidential travel, both locally in Washington and worldwide. Vice presidential travel and visiting foreign heads of state were occasionally supported on a case by case basis. As more team members became available, the impetus of USSS management was to cover as many POTUS movements as possible, but having a team sitting with POTUS on every single trip and movement was not always possible. We tried very hard to do it from 2004 onward, as the size of the team swelled. The 9/11 attacks saw a surge in Hammer missions, many merely symbolic - the team parked on West Executive Drive near the West Wing for days on end. During overnight out of town visits, there were often two Hammer teams, a day and a night shift. Alternately, a smaller team of two ‘midnighters’ was used when POTUS was safely bedded down. On many occasions, only one team


was deployed for a long trip, and the team leader had to make rational (and sometimes irrational) decisions about when to stand the team down for the night. Arguments about when, and when not, to have Hammer were persistent during my tenure, and often had more to do with travel costs and overtime pay than operational decisions. This led to an awkward default decision to cover as many trips as possible while salami-slicing the scheduled overtime pay as much as possible within the law, and sometimes outside the law. TSD employees won a court case on overtime pay during my tenure, with back pay settlements often running into the tens


of thousands of dollars. The original cadre of Hammer


members was drawn from TSD. The core staff at TSD were and are physical security specialists - people hired by the USSS for their existing knowledge and experience in one or more technical security disciplines such as CBRN, firefighting, EOD, electronics, or similar. A smattering of traditional Secret Service agents were always members as well. In 2003-2004, a massive expansion brought approximately 30 USSS uniformed division technicians into the programme. This was a well intentioned effort to increase the programme’s operational capacity, but the overall effect was to dilute the expertise. Although the new technicians had


been through an intensive compressed training programme, only a few had any significant experience in CBRN matters. As often happens when two different populations are suddenly combined, there was a degree of us versus them tension that did not help the overall programme. Given the overall need for personnel, however, it was clear in 2003- 2004 that traditional TSD recruitment efforts could never have produced 30 additional staff. My own opinion was that slow, organic growth would have been better, but this would not have delivered the boots on the ground that management clearly wanted. From modest beginnings, Hammer


developed into a four person operating team, adding a fifth person in 2004. Number one was the team leader, who travelled well in advance of a visit. During the visit, number one would shadow the protective detail with a rucksack full of gear, and be within sight of POTUS most of the time, for instance back stage or in the hallway. Team members two through four would arrive with the rest of the motorcade vehicles one or two days before the visit. During the visit, team members two,


CBRNe Convergence, Orlando, USA, 6-8 November 2018 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2018 50 CBRNe WORLD February 2018 www.cbrneworld.com


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