Massive attack


it benefits people. In the genomics and proteomics arena we do a lot of work in environmental analysis, for the National Science Foundation (NSF) we run samples for an ecological observatory network and the same tools and processes that we develop for those programmes are of relevance for CBRN defence. There are blurred lines between traditional CBRNE defence and what is public health and environmental, and all of that plays off each other.” The tools Dr Dickens and his team


are working on are for a highly specialised form of CBRN forensics. While they could be used in low level scenarios, such as finding ricin in a West Virginia shack, the focus is more on the high consequence/profile incidents. These could be operations overseas, or in the homeland, but primarily the customers for the research are more interested in pathogens than people. “Law enforcement is pretty focused on the facts of the human, they don’t want to know everything though that might change. We have been pushing integrated forensics since 2013 and to be honest when we first briefed it to government customers they were hesistant. Chem, bio and genomics folks traditionally work in silos and rarely meet, so some people thought we were trying to put them out of a job by consolidating disciplines. That is not what we are trying to do. Rather, we are trying to bring all the disciplines together to deal with this much more directly to enhance all the data available. It is a different type of thinking. Right now it is US government labs until it gains acceptance, and then other people including LE will jump on board in the future,” said Dr Dickens. One of the problems in bringing all


the disciplines together is that there tends to be a degree of specialisation in scientific fields along with disparagement of the others. Individuals who have spent 20 years working with one piece of technology tend to emphasise its capability and why it excels over the rest. Suggesting they share precious samples with other technology (whatever that might be) and that it might provide information that their field might not, tends to fill


them with horror. How then has Battelle managed to persuade the various silos that there might be something valuable in other fields? Dr Kuhlman suggested that it went back to procedures and planning. “One of the things that takes place


with samples for analysis is an exploitation plan. If we look at Amerithrax, the material there was quite precious and there were a number of different analyses that needed to be performed by different labs. The idea behind the exploitation plan is to communicate to the LE community: ‘Here is what we intend to do with the material provided and here is the insight it can provide’. Many physical and chemical analyses are destructive of the sample, so if you haven’t found anything you might have squandered a precious material. You need to go through it and explain the type of information that can be provided, what it can tell you and what will still be uncertain: you do the analysis on paper before you execute it. Sometimes communicating that can be challenging, but national level LE has become much more sophisticated in terms of understanding what the different techniques can provide. It is an easier slog these days than it was 15 years ago.” Dr Dickens in his CBRNe


Convergence presentation showed what this integrated forensic approach can deliver. He outlined two blind studies that were given to their forensics teams, one involving a suspected BW attack and the other at an unknown lab. The first scenario, with horribly messy samples, had an initial prognosis of anthrax exposure, the team revealed that it was Enterobacter aerogenes and khat usage that had provided those symptoms. The second, at the lab, was also filled with complicated sample matrices (including blood in soil), and the team was able to discover a novel bioengineered toxin as well as chemical signatures of CWA and explosives. Dr Dickens has been using the results from these studies as examples of what you can find when you are not using one technology in a sequential order, but combining them in an integrated manner.


The hope would be that this would


become easier with time and exposure to samples. Once you start to pull together all these different technologies, target substances and complex matrices then you’ll get a feel for what works well under what circumstances. Dr Kuhlman suggested that the current plan for the system was not optimised for dealing with thousands of samples, instead it was for dealing with the one- offs that had a small set of samples and needed a customised plan. Dr Dickens agreed: “I would love to see this become formulaic! The amount of data that we generate on each sample set is enormous, and once you couple that with multiple, possibly thousands, of sample sets I don’t think we will ever reach the position where it is formulaic. We want to be prepared to detect the anomalous, across numerous matrices chasing signatures whether chemical, biological or human and all of them are present at different levels. We are driven by impacts on matrices, signatures and the limit of detection of our devices to pull positive results out. It would be the end goal to be formulaic, but I don’t think we’ll ever get there.” Commercial DNA testing services,


like 23andMe or Ancestry.com, are bringing analysis to the masses. Whether people want to know if their ancestors might ever have trod beside the Nile or suffered from Parkinson's disease they now realise there is a kit for that. Tools like MPS are one of the likely ways forward in DNA analysis, and Battelle is already using it for some of its forensic work. The challenge for people like Battelle is when do they stop interrogating someone’s DNA? So much of what we look like and are is held in the DNA it can provide information as to whether we are likely to have ginger hair, be overweight, bad breath etc. [Hey! Get off my PII! Ed.] It might also hold information on conditions/diseases that the individual may, or may not, be aware of, such as diabetes etc, which might potentially have value in a criminal investigation. All this becomes a potential


personally identifiable information (PII) nightmare for suspects who might be cleared of a crime, but learn that the


CBRNe Convergence, Orlando, USA, 6-8 November 2018 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2018 40 CBRNe WORLD February 2018 www.cbrneworld.com


CBRNeWORLD


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