Taking the Pulse


with a text from a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) agent saying they had received information that there was possibly a shooting at a downtown nightclub with a potential hostage situation where the individual was claiming to be a member of ISIS. “I immediately requested more


information and contacted our overnight group, the Command and Technical Operations Centre (CTOC), to find out whether there was anything on social media or the news and there was nothing. Most FBI agents, or ASACs, would not reach out to the chief of police at 02.45 on a Sunday morning, but because we have that relationship, and because I am not very patient, I wasn’t about to risk not being there for him. I called Chief Mina and wasn’t prepared for his response. It was a very thick silence, I sensed something was wrong and John said something to the effect; ‘Ron, it’s bad, there’s at least 25 dead.’ That was the extent of the conversation and I replied with ‘I’m on my way.’ At that time, that early in the morning, the last thing I was worried about was whether this was going to be an FBI led response. I just knew that no matter what it was, whether it was terrorism or violent crime, I was on my way to help John and OPD and send all the resources I had just based on the fact that he had said he was dealing with a casualty count. “I arrived in short order, raced to


the scene all the while despatching my entire FBI staff in Orlando and also awoke the special response teams: everything from SWAT, the evidence response team and the hostage rescue team up in Quantico. We started working collectively, myself, John Mina, Sheriff Demings and SAC Banks [FDLE] all got into the command post (CP) and started attacking the problem together. It wasn’t until the situation was resolved when the hostage taker/terrorist was encountered by SWAT and became deceased that everyone in that CP decided that this should be an FBI led investigation, since we were familiar with the shooter after dealing with him a couple of times in the past and his statements regarding ISIS. Knowing the communication he


had had with the 9/11 call centre it was a natural fit for the FBI to take the lead. Even that was a collective decision made by the chief, the sheriff, and FDLE SAC. I still looked at it as a collaborative effort as those agencies have a strong participation on our JTTF, which is the body that assumed ownership of that investigation.” Terrorist events usually have their


own pace, which for the responders is usually somewhere around light speed. Threats like those Mateen made about placing some improvised explosive devices (IEDs), tend to disrupt this so there’s a pause as EOD search to ensure that the scene is clear, and that the necessary cordons are in place. Usually it becomes a balance between being safe and maintaining momentum. Have Orlando responders put new protocols in place to ensure that if this happened again momentum would be maintained throughout? ASAC Hopper disagreed that there had been a slow down to let EOD do their thing, and stated that the speed of the response did not dip at any point in the night. “I’d like to clarify what you said.


There was no slow down. There is a misconception that the PD didn’t go in immediately or were held on the perimeter as we had a soft alert on the vehicle outside, or the suspect was claiming that he possessed explosives. Nothing can be further from the truth in terms of the LE personnel who responded. Within four to five minutes LE were already arriving and moving through the warm zone, tending to the injured, removing injured people, checking pulses, applying first aid, all while other first responders held the shooter at bay where he had holed up in the women’s rest room. There was no slow crawl except for the time when the shooter met his demise during the exchange of gunfire with LE. As victims and hostages were being rescued by SWAT, naturally they were moving through the scene deliberately, but I wouldn’t call it slow or reserved. “In terms of whether anything has been developed technology-wise, robots were used on the vehicle we were concerned with. I am not sure if any new technology has come out of the Pulse


response, however the response was extraordinary and I can’t speak enough good about the men and women that responded that night. The situation went from active shooter, to barricaded suspect, to hostage negotiation, to hostage rescue. There is a very fine line between those dynamics and if the appropriate decisions aren’t made lives can be lost. From the time that LE initial responders entered the building, not a single shot was fired, until the hostage rescue effort when Mateen got into a shoot-out with law enforcement. That is an important factor when you consider the different dynamics and phases of that response.” Every situation has a number of


phases, and one that had to be done in slow time was after the death of the perpetrator, which was the slow clearing of discarded bags. It was the same in London, Paris and every other mass casualty event, as EOD make sure that there aren’t any leave-behind devices to target LE. According to the AAR documents attempts were made to put a UGV into the scene, but the clutter was such that it would have meant severe disruption to evidence and potential devices. Following this experience has


Orlando considered anything that could improve on their room clearing response ? Again, ASAC Hopper thought not; “Technologically I am not aware of anything, there’s nothing I would say I wish I’d had. If we could have had cameras located with the hostages, as well as the hostage taker, that would have been amazing. In order to get those cameras in place, however, you are not only talking about compromising the captives but also compromising your position if you are attempting a hostage rescue. As difficult as the situation was I could not be more proud of how it was resolved, just knowing we rescued 30 hostages out of that attempt. Couldn’t be more proud of everyone.” Like many other attacks the one


element that all the AARs highlighted was the lack of communications. Individuals either lacked the frequency or the training for the radios to work, cellphones predictably failed and not all individuals were briefed on elements of


CBRNe Convergence, Orlando, USA, 6-8 November 2018 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2018 44 CBRNe WORLD February 2018 www.cbrneworld.com


CBRNeWORLD


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