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The music of the Ainur


mixtures with minimal impact from interferents or background chemicals and materials, and detection of chemicals of interest with concentrations that may be several orders of magnitude below the ambient chemical background. The ability to identify a broad range of chemical species enables a single remote site detector to screen for multiple chemical targets of interest and allows analysis of subtle changes in the overall chemical effluent from monitored locations – especially when there are several possible target molecules. “ “Chemical classes that are of interest


in the Maeglin programme include, but are not limited to: explosives and energetics, including military, commercial, and homemade varieties, as well as common oxidisers and fuels; chemical weapons, their precursors, and byproducts; poisonous or toxic industrial and environmental chemicals or pollutants; narcotics, including illicit, prescription, and designer drugs of abuse; nuclear fuel cycle materials and related chemicals; signatures indicative of common natural and industrial chemical processes, such as combustion, petroleum fractionation, and pesticide manufacturing; chemicals associated with the manufacture and deployment of biological warfare agents… Although the programme’s goals do not include the ability to detect bio-agent species directly, chemical signatures of bio-agent production and weaponisation may be detectable…” “The progamme intends to develop


an ultra-low power chemical analysis system for remote site detection and identification of [the agents listed above]. Programme goals include definitive chemical identification of species with an atomic mass <500amu; a system footprint of less than or equal to 1.5litres; a weight of less than or equal to 7kg, including sufficient power and, if necessary, consumables for two-year operation with daily sample analysis; and autonomous operation (including calibration). The autonomous collection and analysis of gases is a required capability; modular, interchangeable input units enabling the analysis of bulk liquid and solid samples (introduced by a


user) and liquid or particulate aerosols (either collected autonomously or introduced by a user) are desirable additional capabilities.” To anyone even remotely interested


in chemical detection the requirement above looks more like a letter to Santa than a rational list of goals, but as Dr DeWitt stated, the plan is high risk, high payoff. Silmarils is equally aspirational. It’s


BAA seeking: “…to develop a portable system for real time standoff detection and identification of trace chemical residues on surfaces using active infrared spectroscopy (IR) at a 30m range. Programme goals include: high chemical sensitivity and specificity across a broad range of target classes; effective operation in a real world environment accounting for issues such as gas phase and surface adsorbed clutter, varying substrates, temperature, humidity, indoor/outdoor background light; a system that is eye safe and has a visually unobservable illumination beam; human-portable size and power draw commensurate with limited duration battery operation; and a rapid scan rate…” “Primary chemical classes and


specific representative examples that are of interest in the programme include, but are not limited to: explosives; nitro- based compounds such as TNT and RDX, newer formulations such as acetone peroxide, and homemade explosives such as fertiliser bombs, chemical weapons and poisonous or toxic chemicals; chemical weapons… newer non-traditional agents, and toxic chemicals…, narcotics; Illicit drugs such as cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine, or legal but abused drugs such as Vicodin or hydrocodone. Secondary targets include compounds associated with the manufacture and deployment of biological agents and nuclear materials…” Both Maeglin and Silmarils BAAs are


worth reading (links are via https://www.iarpa.gov/ index.php/ research-programs) but CBRNe World will not be liable for mouth strain injuries caused by constant jaw dropping. When you look at what Nato’s specialised CBRN research centres have


been working on for the past 70 years and not come close to achieving, both projects seem incredible. What is also boggling is that this is for the intelligence community, which many think of as just a nebulous band of analysts and field agents. The requirements outlined above initially seem to be more suited to a DARPA or HSARPA (defence and home security advanced research projects activity respectively). Both have standing cadres of individuals whose sole purpose is the detection of these substances of interest. An opening question for Dr DeWitt has to be: Should all these electric dreams by realised, who is going to operate them? Is this for James Bond or a Sector 7 drone? “From the IARPA perspective we are


an activity under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and that oversees and integrates the 17 elements of the intelligence community, such as the National Security Agency (NSA), CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and intelligence elements of the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of State, Coastguard Intelligence etc. An IARPA programme won’t start unless it has mission needs in one of those coins of the intelligence community. We talk to the potential end users, do gap analyses and we set what we come out with as our BAA metrics, a capability that meets future needs. Some of the mission partners that are interested in Maeglin and Silmarils are the FBI and DHS, who does research for the TSA, Secret Service, CBP etc.” The trouble with the intelligence


community is that it has such a wide brief. What might be needed in an undercover operation for the FBI has a weight and power restriction that might not, for example, be needed for the TSA. The sensitivity requirements to look for trace explosives on luggage may be much lower than needed to monitor air quality for early warning of a terrorist attack. Dr Dewitt stated that there wasn’t a particular restriction on performance parameters such as size, weight and power (SWP) or sensitivity that meant that once something fulfilled a certain physical envelope or


CBRNe Convergence, Orlando, USA, 6-8 November 2018 www.cbrneworld.com/convergence2018 14 CBRNe WORLD February 2018 www.cbrneworld.com


CBRNeWORLD


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