care providers with specific departures from standards of care, the court con- tinued as follows: Equally egregious, however, is that the Certificates failed to state what the standard of care was or how Dr. Imoke or Dr. Konits departed from it.
What was the standard of care expected of them? What duty did either have in regard to removing the catheter? Was Dr. Konits, the oncologist, supposed to remove the catheter, inserted surgically by Dr. Imoke, upon the termination of chemotherapy? Was he supposed to call Dr. Imoke to inform him that the chemotherapy had been completed? Was he supposed to tell Carroll to call Dr. Imoke? Was Dr. Imoke sup- posed to call Dr. Konits from time to time to check on the progress of the chemotherapy? Was he supposed to call Carroll from time to time for that purpose? Was he supposed to tell Carroll to call him when she completed chemotherapy?
Carroll v. Konits, 2007 Md. LEXIS at 49, emphasis in original. The suggestion, even in dicta, that this type of informa- tion should have been included in the certificate represents an interpretation of the statutory requirements for a valid certificate of merit that have never before been proclaimed by Maryland’s appellate courts, let alone by the Mary- land legislature. In fact, the requirements proclaimed by the court in Konits are those recently required by the Maryland legislature to be included in the supple- mental certificate of qualified expert to be filed by the parties 15 days after the close of discovery. Specifically, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Annot. § 3-2A-06D. “supplemental certificate of qualified experts” states, in pertinent part, that (b) In general. --
(1) Within 15 days after the date that discovery is required to be completed; a party shall file with the court a supplemental certificate of a qualified expert, for each defendant, that attests to:
(i) The certifying expert’s basis for alleging what is the specific stan- dard of care;
(ii) The certifying expert’s quali- fications to testify to the specific standard of care;
(iii) The specific standard of care; (iv) For the plaintiff:
1. The specific injury complained of;
2. How the specific standard of care was breached;
3. What specifically the defendant should have done to meet the spe- cific standard of care; and
4. The inference that the breach of the standard of care proximately caused the plaintiff ’s injury. . . .
This is, of course, in keeping with the legislative intent that the certificate/re- port serve as a screening mechanism at the onset of cases and not as a substitute for discovery.
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