IN DEPTH
Andrew K. Shenton.
A little wisdom from ancient times
What does an ancient Greek paradox tells us about how information professionals should be facilitating search for younger information-seekers. Andrew K. Shenton explores Meno’s paradox in light of today’s world where AI, misinformation and information overload can all impact how we evaluate results.
IT may seem incredible to suggest that ideas which originate from the time of the ancient Greeks continue to have significant implica- tions. for the investigative efforts of young people today.
This is certainly true of Meno’s Paradox, set down by Plato and recounted in such authoritative sources as the Encyclopedia Britannica.1
Essentially, we
can summarise the problem as follows: inquiry that does no more than confirm what an individual already knows is pointless, and it is fruitless for the person to investigate what they do not know as the unknown cannot be recognised, even if it is found. Let us explore the implications of this for the young information-seekers whom many of us serve. In terms of the first strand, I have often cautioned Sixth Form students pursuing the Extended Project Qualification (EPQ) against devising research ques- tions whose answers are apparent from the outset. I have written previously that it should not be easy to forecast the study’s conclusion “in advance of the appropriate information/data being collected and analysed”.2
One strategy typically employed when evaluating information also brings to mind the first element of the Paradox. It has long been recommended that inquirers should verify the accuracy of information they access against material in other sources. In the early 1980s, Ernest Paterson was advocating
36 INFORMATION PROFESSIONAL
such action in his “checklist of information skills”,3 and, some forty-four years later, Dorian Lynskey was still highlighting its value, on this occasion within a discussion on the dangers of AI-generated material.4
In practice, though, few youngsters take precautions that are so rigorous, probably as a result of the time and effort demanded by the necessary checking. We might expect any validatory work which does happen to operate at a more internal and instinctive level, with users testing what they see and hear against their own experience. Does it, in their opinion, “ring true”? The frequency with which this method is employed is noted by Roger Graef 5
but it is undermined by obvious weaknesses. It
lacks viability when the individual has little per- sonal knowledge of the matter in question and, as Bob McHenry outlines, in order to make a proper assessment one has to know the subject so well that there would seem little point in looking it up in the first place,6
so returning us to the kind of futility that is central to Meno’s Paradox. Yet, McHenry’s criticism is not pertinent in all circumstances; even an inquirer who is familiar with the salient facts and issues well may seek confirmatory material from a respected source so as to endow their analysis with greater rigour.
The second aspect of Meno’s Paradox evokes “the problem of non-specifiability of information need” that has been raised by Nicholas Belkin.7
In simple February-March 2026
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