Country Watch
committed; some of the crimes, such as systemic attacks against political or ethnic groups, may con- stitute crimes against humanity. According to the Commission, though the security situation in Ivory Coast had improved, violence was still a problem in parts of the country, and Ouattara’s government must punish forces who continue to carry out acts of violence. Among other recommendations, the Commission advised the Ivory Coast to seek judi- cial and military action against some suspects and establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
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President Ouattara has publicly committed to end- ing impunity and protecting human rights in the Ivory Coast. Keeping to his word, he issued inter- national arrest warrants for members of the Gbag- bo government in June. In July, he signed a decree establishing a domestic commission of inquiry to investigate the crimes and human rights violations committed during the height of the post-election violence. Based on its findings, the commission is to provide recommendations on how to prevent future crises. To further demonstrate his resolve, Ouattara has also asked the commission to coop- erate with the International Criminal Court to inves- tigate the most serious offenses committed.
However, many international organizations, includ- ing Human Rights Watch, have called for investi- gations of Ouattara, believing his forces are con- tinuing to attack supporters of former president Gbagbo. Officials from the UN Mission in the Ivory Coast (MINUCI) have also called for an investiga- tion of Ouattara and his forces, as MINUCI staff have witnessed retaliatory attacks.
Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has promised that the UN will maintain its presence in the Ivory Coast to protect civilians from further violations of humanitarian law. During the crisis, the UN Human Rights Division in the Ivory Coast established a hotline for people to report human rights violations, and thus is now a key resource to the investigation.
* Submitted by Christine Long
South Sudan, Sudan Reach Temporary Arrangement for Disputed Abyei Region
On June 20, 2011, Sudan and South Sudan agreed to demilitarize the oil-rich Abyei territory that strad- dles the shared border between the two countries and allow United Nations security forces to patrol the region. According to this agreement, Ethiopian soldiers will make up the Interim Security Force for Abyei (ISFA) while Sudan and South Sudan try to resolve competing ownership claims to the re- gion. The African Union (AU) panel that brokered the deal was led by former South African presi- dent Thabo Mbeki and included Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The two sides agreed to allow ISFA to police the region, and neither state will have troops in the territory for the month of September.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon praised this agreement, but also urged Sudan and South Su- dan to continue collaborating with the AU on the peaceful administration of Abyei. He also urged the AU, UN, Sudan, and South Sudan to mediate all outstanding issues related to the Comprehen- sive Peace Agreement (CPA), a 2005 settlement intended to end decades of fighting over Abyei.
The CPA provisions, which includes the Abyei Protocol, stated that a referendum for the inde- pendence of South Sudan should occur at the same time residents of the Abyei region vote on whether to belong to the north or the south. Until the vote was held, the Abyei Protocol ordered the joint administration of Abyei by Sudan and the Su- dan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), rep- resentatives of what is now the country of South Sudan.
On January 9, 2011, southerners in Sudan voted overwhelmingly to secede from the rest of Sudan during the CPA-stipulated independence refer- endum. However, the referendum on Abyei was never held because of a number of problems in- cluding disagreements over voter eligibility. Thus, tensions over the control of Abyei escalated once
ILSA Quarterly » volume 20 » issue 1 » October 2011
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