Court Watch
to perform any particular duties in the exercise of governmental authority.
After the ECtHR determined that Sabeh El Leil was not a diplomatic agent of Kuwait, it turned to the question of due process entitlements owed to him under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court reiterated that Article 6 guarantees all litigants the right to an effective judicial remedy by enabling them to assert their civil rights before a court or tribunal. Possible limitations to be applied to the right must not restrict or reduce access to such an extent that the very essence of the right is violated, particularly in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial. Proportionality is key, and in this case France did not properly balance Sabeh El Leil’s rights with those of Kuwait, between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved, thus unjustly interfering with his right of access to the courts.
8
With the Article 6 § 1 violation by France firmly established, the ECtHR ordered the French gov- ernment to pay Sabeh El Leil almost € 77,000 in damages and court costs.
* Submitted by Giuliana Quattrocchi
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Four Arrest Warrants in Hariri Assassination
On June 30, 2011, the United Nations-backed Spe- cial Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) issued four arrest warrants related to the 2005 assassination of Leba- non’s former prime minister, Rafik Hariri. The promi- nent Sunni leader was killed when his motorcade was hit by a suicide bomber in Beirut. In addition to Hariri, 21 other individuals were killed in the blast, and 231 were injured. The arrest warrants named four high-ranking members of the Lebanese-Shi- ite group, Hezbollah: Mustafa Badreddine, Salim Ayyash, Hussein Oneissi, and Assad Sabra.
These initial warrants required the Lebanese gov- ernment to detain the named men within 30 days. If no arrests were made within that time frame, the
warrants indicated that the STL would publicize the indictments and order summons for the suspects.
Since no arrests were made within the speci- fied time frame, the STL released the full indict- ment against the Hezbollah members on August 17, 2011. The document charged all four men with conspiracy aimed to commit a terrorist act and fur- ther charged each man with additional counts. The indictment accused Badreddine and Ayyash as being the prime actors in coordinating the attack and charged them with counts of committing a ter- rorist act, intentional homicide, and attempted in- tentional homicide. The indictment further claims that Oneissi and Sabra acted as accomplices who served to mislead the investigation.
The 47-page full indictment details the activities incriminating the named individuals and the roles each played in the attack. Though the indictment itself recognizes that the case is largely built on circumstantial evidence, it also mentions that cir- cumstantial evidence has probative value and can sometimes be more influential than direct evi- dence. Cellular phone data and call logs placing the four men within close proximity of Hariri’s location appear to have played the central role in the inves- tigation and subsequent indictment. Nonetheless, the indictment urges that “all four Accused played important roles in the attack on 14 February 2005 and therefore all four bear criminal responsibility for the results of the attack.”
The issuance of these indictments serves as an important milestone for Lebanon and the Arab world, but several experts warn that the indict- ments could increase tensions in the already po- larized nation. While Hariri supporters embrace the STL investigation for seeking accountability for the 2005 attack, Hezbollah and its supporters continue to deny involvement in the assassination and as- sail the investigation as corrupted by Western in- fluences.
* Submitted by Kristen Klump
ILSA Quarterly » volume 20 » issue 1 » October 2011
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