by Steve Ernst AL
Editor’s Page Not a Drop
Whatever details emerge from ongoing in- vestigations of the water quality crisis in Flint, Michigan, and count the FBI among the agen- cies reviewing the mess, this much is certain: Qualified scientists reported their concerns to responsible parties long before it became a national story and Michigan officials acted. To be specific, Flint resident Lee Anne Walters sent a sample to the EPA after water in her home tested positive for lead at a level of 104 parts per billion (EPA guidelines indicate action is necessary after a measurement of 15 parts per billion). In a February 27th e-mail from EPA water expert Miguel Del Toral, who an- alyzed the sample from Walters, to Mike Prysby (an engineer in the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality [DEQ] Community Water Supply Program) and Jennifer Crooks (Michigan program manager for the EPA’s Region 5 Ground Water and Drinking Water office),
“Where you find lead values that high, it is usual- ly due to particulate lead.” And, “Particulate lead is released sporadically from lead service lines, leaded solder and leaded brass…. Pre-flushing the tap the night before collection of (Lead and Copper Rule) compliance samples (the Michigan DEQ still provides these instructions to public water systems)…clears particulate lead out of the plumbing and biases the results low…. If systems are pre-flushing and still find- ing particulate lead, the amount of particulate lead in the system can be higher than what is being detected using these ‘pre-flushed’ first- draw samples.” And finally, “…I was wondering what (Flint’s) optimized corrosion control treat- ment was? They are required to have optimized corrosion control treatment in place…. ”
As is usual, it all starts with money. Newly elect- ed Michigan Governor Rick Snyder appointed an emergency manager to oversee economi- cally stressed Flint. Subsequently, a decision was made to participate in a pipeline project to
bring Flint water from Lake Huron, the primary reason being economic. Disconnecting from the Detroit water system in 2014 left Flint in need of a source of water until the pipeline’s scheduled completion in 2016. That was the Flint River, a source whose quality was known to be poor and whose particular problems were fairly well-documented. (In an ominous portent, not long after the switch, the local General Motors plant stopped using Flint River water because it was corroding parts.) The change meant the municipality was now engaged in water production, whereas in the past it had engaged only in the transmission of water to consumers. The Michigan DEQ ap- proved the use of the river as a source, and of the facility, based on the Flint treatment plant’s past performance as a standby facility.
It’s a complicated story. (For a detailed ac- count, please see
http://bridgemi.com, the website of The Center for Michigan, which was the source for much of the information here.) There are multiple state agencies and institutions playing a part, from Governor Rick Snyder’s office to the City of Flint and its municipal water agency, from the U.S. EPA to the Michigan DEQ. Who had responsibility? You can find within the story many threads. For example, EPA Region 5 administrator Susan Hedman, who eventually resigned over the issue, and who, assessing that responsi- bility lay elsewhere, focused on getting the Michigan DEQ to take action.
This is where I get tripped up—doesn’t a reading of 104 parts per billion of lead stop everything? Or, as Virginia Tech researcher and professor Marc Edwards, whose water analysis helped uncover the contamination, said, “At that point, you do not just have smoke, you have a three-alarm fire and should respond immediately…. There was no sense of urgency at any of the relevant agencies,
AMERICAN LABORATORY 6 MARCH 2016
with the obvious exception of Miguel Del Toral, and he was silenced and discred- ited.”
(
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/
news/politics/2016/01/12/epa-stayed-silent- flints-tainted-water/78719620/)
(Whether or not this disaster can be added to the volume of cases of environmental in- justice—how can it not? —is certainly worth considering [and arises in these quarters from a sustained belief that awareness of such is paramount]. But it also the province of the social sciences, and thus further discussion will be withheld.)
Where does this leave us and our drinking water? Most of us assume our water supply is safe. Certainly the science is available to pro- vide adequate testing. The agencies are in place to do the testing. The technology is available to ensure safe delivery. But when a maze of missteps, obfuscation, willful ignorance—shall I stop?—allows a disaster of this proportion (and this is not a minor outbreak) to occur, can anyone feel confident? Are even well-to-do, well-connected neighborhoods immune?
It all comes back to the science. Capable people became alarmed, analyzed samples and re- ported results. Their analysis has to be enough; it’s why they are employed. They need to be the gatekeepers on safety. The well-being of the citizenry is why all the regulations are enacted and the analyses and treatments are done, and has to be the only priority. Even the econom- ics are on the side of safety—wouldn’t it have been cost-effective for Michigan and Flint to have gotten this right the first time? It is time to listen to the science, and only the science.
Steve Ernst is editor and general manager, American Laboratory/Labcompare; sernst@
americanlaboratory.com
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