BUS BOMBINGS
were killed in such attacks and many more injured, which equates to more than 25% of all Israeli civilian deaths during the Second Intifada. But in a typically Israeli stoic manner when it comes to terrorism, passenger numbers reduced by only 10% during this period. Bus drivers and passengers are
particularly vigilant, as Israelis have to be when faced with ever-present security threats. Drivers look out for suspicious looking passengers at bus stops, and since the Second Intifada, have been allowed to choose who may and may not board the bus. One counter tactic is to be suspicious of ultra-Orthodox Jews in areas where one would not normally see them, as bombers dressing as Orthodox Jews before getting on buses became a popular technique during the Intifada. Israel’s deadliest bus bombing
occurred on 19 August 2003 when a Hamas suicide bomber disguised as a Haredi Jew blew himself up on a double length bus in the Shmuel HaNavi quarter of Jerusalem. Many of the passengers were Orthodox Jewish children returning from a visit to the Western Wall. Seven children and 16 adults were killed and more than 130 people were injured. As in many bus bomb attacks in Israel, the bomber wore a belt packed with metal and ball bearings in order to increase the fatal and injurious effects of the blast. Following the first wave of
suicide attacks in the mid-1990s, the Egged bus company started to put security officers on buses, at bus stations and at bus stops to watch for attackers and at the height of the bus attacks had a force of 450 personnel, many of them recent veterans of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) special forces units, who receive intelligence from the police and military about potential attacks. Attack tactics have not always
involved a bomber entering the bus as a passenger; other tactics have been a suicide bomber ramming an explosive-laden vehicle into a bus, a suicide bomber detonating their explosives at a bus stop or bus station and attackers – not necessarily on
AUGUST 2010
suicide missions – driving into crowds waiting at bus stops. In response to the high increase in
attacks against Israel following the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the Israeli government launched Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002. This was an incursion by the IDF into the West Bank, placing then Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat under siege in his compound, detaining thousands of Palestinians and subjecting the majority to strict curfews and the
“
...more than 200 civilians were killed in such attacks...which equates to more than 25% of all Israeli civilian deaths during the 2nd Intifada...”
destruction of property. Hundreds of Palestinians were killed in the operation. Although it had some effect on reducing the number of suicide attacks in Israel, and increasing the number of attacks successfully thwarted, the goals of the operation were unmet in that such attacks continued at a high rate. In early 2005, the Second Intifada came to an end, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced that the frequent violent attacks which characterised this period would no longer continue. Although the end of the uprising – which was also marked by the release of 900 Palestinian prisoners and Israel agreeing to pull out of the Gaza Strip entirely and some areas of the West Bank – had some effect on Palestinian militant attacks against Israel, it was not enough of a deterrent on its own to prevent future suicide attacks, including those on buses. The Israeli government purports that
the greatest factor in reducing militant attacks in Israel has been the West Bank
Separation Barrier; a highly controversial structure due to it cutting off West Bank Palestinian communities from each other and from East Jerusalem. Militant groups have also said that the Barrier presents a major obstacle to conducting attacks. Regarding bus attacks, one of the most dangerous routes was along the Wada Ara Road, from Tel Aviv to the West Bank border town of Afula, where until the construction of the Wall, the de facto border between the West Bank and Israel was a porous zone through which many Palestinian militants entered Israel. The idea of the Barrier first came into being in 1994, during the Oslo Accords, under the government of Yitzhak Rabin, to protect residents of sovereign Israel (the pre-1967 borders land, before the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank) from attack. With the increasing violence of the Second Intifada, work on the Barrier started in earnest in 2002. By mid-2005, almost half of the originally proposed length and route of the Barrier – which in parts is a high concrete wall and razor wire design, with watch towers - had been constructed. Statistics have shown that the construction of the barrier has substantially reduced the number of Palestinian attacks in Israel and in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. While there is general agreement that the Barrier has significantly reduced the number of suicide attacks – and in places where it has been constructed, infiltrations have been reduced to zero - there are questions regarding how effective it has been in stopping other attacks. A report by the Shin Beit security service in 2006 stated that attacks in 2005 significantly decreased because of the increased pursuance of Palestinian militants by the Israeli military and Hamas's increased political activity. Since the end of 2005, there
have been no attacks on buses or at bus stations or stops in Israel. It is likely due to a combination of factors; the end of the Second Intifada, Gaza being handed over to Palestinian Authority Control, the increased pursuance of Palestinian militants by Israel, and the construction of the West Bank Separation Barrier.
ix CounterTerrorGazette
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