sate, some commonsense steps have now been widely adopted, such as replacing every other metal detector with an X-ray system, which helps alleviate the longer divesting and repacking times. However, many airports have had to build out facilities and add more lanes to meet capacity. When the liquids rules are finally relaxed, it is likely
that bottles will need to be screened in trays, adding to the divesting burden as well as increasing the number of secondary search inspections. TSA recently relaxed its rule on removing laptops from certain types of briefcases, but until this is broadened to include most briefcase types, it is unlikely to raise the processing rate at the checkpoint and potentially may increase confusion and delays in the short term. However, the additional views offered by AT X-rays should
reduce the need for bags to be re-screened as there is less likelihood of objects being hidden in several views.
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baggage screening. A US company called Clear Path has a compact robot-mountable fast neutron system for inspecting unattended bags and such technology could potentially be adapted to secondary search. Both companies are taking advantage of 20 years of technology improvement since TNA was last considered for aviation applications.
“...divesting and repacking of personal items are the rate-limiting steps at the checkpoint...”
Processes Divesting and repacking of personal items are the rate- limiting steps at the checkpoint. Worldwide, passengers have to remove various items (such as laptops, toiletries, camcorders, etc) from bags and place them in trays for separate screening. Though in place for several years, this extra divesting has substantially reduced checkpoint throughput and raised passenger frustration. From a pre-9/11 average of 275 passengers per hour per lane; after 9/11, lanes more typically processed 225 to 235 passengers per hour per lane, a 15 to 20% reduction in Europe and as low as 100 to 200 passengers per hour in the US due to enhanced divesting. To partly compen-
16
The Future In spite of a desire for harmonisation between the US and Europe regarding regulations, it appears that both are approaching the problem differently. In Europe, discus- sion has focused on customising algorithms to focus the AT systems on what they do well, driving the false alarm rates down as low as possible and leaving the rest of the threat up to the operators. This would lead to a parallel initial inspec- tion process, one automatic and the other human. The TSA, while currently lacking a certification standard similar to Hold Baggage Screening (the current AT qualification standards are less stringent), expects that in future, a harmonisation of hold and cabin baggage threat types will occur, although not likely for the next couple of years. Also, the approach to relaxing the “3-1-1” rule appears to differ between the US and Europe. For the complex challenges of cabin baggage screening, a
high speed, cost-reduced CT system would likely provide the best detection capability, but it remains to be seen whether the hurdles of cost, reliability and size can be overcome. Failing that, novel designs are being explored by several companies that might fall between AT and CT in terms of capabilities. TSA is evaluating 3DX-Ray’s binocular-vision AT X-ray and Reveal Imaging is adapting its Array-CT laminography system to meet AT image quality and liquid screening standards. SureScan Corporation is testing a scanner for hold baggage that uses many X-ray views, produces a 3D image yet does not fully fall into the CT category. If it achieves TSA hold baggage certification, the approach might be applicable to cabin baggage (as well as cargo) screening, if X-ray tube size can be scaled and reliability ensured. It may also validate the introduction of spectroscopic Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CZT) to replace the photon-counting detectors that have been used on X-ray and CT systems to date. However, even CT is unlikely to provide a comprehensive solution for the wide breadth of materials, geometries and concealment methods that terrorists could use. To fill in the detection gaps (and to reduce the burden higher false alarms will have on secondary search), a suite of secondary technologies, e.g. QR, trace, possibly neutron techniques may have a role in
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www.asi-mag.com August 2010 Aviationsecurityinternational
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