Grenfell inquiry


Simon Lawrence’s comments highlighted. He stated that Harley ‘via their


supply chain are questioning the rating of the cladding firebreaks’, and that ‘apparently by going to 2hrs as we discussed has a cost increase of around £12k’, with Mr Crawford agreeing with inquiry lawyer Richard Millett that there was ‘pressure on site’ to avoid recommending upgrading the barriers, after being asked whether ‘the main concern was cost and delay as opposed to fire safety’. Mr Crawford responded: ‘I


can’t speak on behalf of the other participants in that conversation but you might read that into what they’ve written, yes’. The news outlet referred to a 2018 report by Arup’s Dr Barbara Lane which found there were ‘missing and defective’ cavity barriers, while horizontal barriers had been ‘incorrectly installed vertically’, and windows in individual flats ‘had no fire barriers encasing them’, with openings ‘surrounded by combustible material’. Asked whether he had


considered the fire performance of the building’s architectural ‘crown’, Mr Crawford replied that he ‘just understood it to be more aluminium panels’. When asked whether he gave ‘any thought to how a fire might be able to spread uninhibited’ across the crown ‘in the absence of any cavity barriers’, he stated that ‘in the absence of cavity barriers I would understand fire just to go straight out into the atmosphere. ‘I don’t know what I thought at


the time. I wasn’t noting everything I thought consciously at the time’. Mr Crawford was also questioned about his ‘judgment’ in signing off window designs from Harley that included combustible material such as Styrofoam, Mr Millett asking ‘how could a drawing specification be signed off as compliant with architectural intent if in fact it did not comply with statutory requirements?’ Mr Crawford ‘repeatedly’ said he was commenting only from the


view of ‘architectural intent’, and that it was Harley’s responsibility ‘to ensure the materials were compliant’. Mr Millet suggested it was a ‘manifest error for any architect’ to see styrofoam and approve it without compliance checks or confirmation that fire retardant had been added. Mr Crawford responded: ‘Not if you believed it was the responsibility of the sub contractor to ensure it was compliant – then you would assume they had exercised duty.’


Focus on ‘appearance and cost’ The Independent also reported on testimony from architect Tomas Rek, who drew up specifications for the refurbishment, and who said he was ‘not involved’ in any discussion about fire performance of cladding panels, with the focus instead on ‘appearance and cost’. Mr Rek also said that the client and cladding contractor were ‘motivated by cost concerns’ to switch to ACM and that he had ‘never previously worked’ with it and did not know panels could be made with combustible plastic cores.


He also stated that he was


not trained in using facade materials in overcladding systems, and was asked by Mr Millett how original plans for zinc panels ‘came to be dropped’ and ACM selected, who added: ‘Did you get the impression that Studio E was under pressure from the client to specify cheaper ACM material rather than zinc?’ Mr Rek replied that this was


NEWS


the case and came ‘from the client’. The inquiry was also shown an email to Mr Rek from Harley Facades’ Mark Harris, in which Mr Harris said that ‘from a Harley selfish point of view our preference would be to use ACM’, as it could be ‘confident about how much it would cost’. Mr Rek stated that despite


drawing up a specification, he ‘did not check buildings regulations guidance about fire resistance and fire spread on external walls’, adding: ‘I do not recall discussing the fire rating or fire performance of polyethylene-based composite panels while I worked on the project. I also do not recall discussing whether these panels came with fire-retardant cores or whether any investigation on compliance with part B of the Building Regulations 2010 had taken place.’


On being asked whether it


‘would have been important to familiarise himself’ with guidance on fire safety before drafting the specification, he added: ‘Retrospectively, it would have helped if I had a better understanding. It’s a lesson learned. But we had a fire consultant on the job and I considered fire-related issues quite a complicated subject outside of my competence.’ Material choices were made


despite standardised specification documents issued by Mr Rek, including a warning that ‘systemised building envelopes’ need to meet building regulations, and that ‘aluminium envelope systems do not normally have significant resistance to fire’. It also warned that use of any combustible material for insulation ‘might need to be considered’ as building height increased, with Mr Rek asked by Mr Millett if he ‘was aware of that as a general principle’. In response, he replied ‘no’, and on being asked if he was aware of the concept of materials of limited combustibility’, he replied ‘I’m not sure’. Mr Millett concluded (Story continues overleaf)


www.frmjournal.com MAY 2020 15


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