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Any of these issues would be cause for serious concern had fire ever been taken seriously as a threat to passengers.
Piper Alpha disaster
The fire and subsequent destruction of Piper Alpha in 1988 caused the worst ever loss of life on an offshore platform and was one of the costliest man made disasters in history. Unfinished maintenance procedures had left a critical pump without its pressure safety valve. A permit had been issued by the engineer, stating that the pump should not be turned on under any circumstances; but the permit was misplaced, and key personnel were not made aware of the issue. Due to a blockage in a critical pipe, staff were
Fireproofing and suppression As a fire had never occurred on a similar vehicle previously, there was no expectation that it could ever happen, which led to many oversights, including the hydraulic line and adjacent power cable which powered the entire resort but were unprotected. The loss of both systems severely hampered the escape and rescue attempts, and could potentially have been prevented with fireproof casing or other measures. Fire suppression in the train or tunnel might
also have helped to control the fire, while venting could have allowed for the release of heat and smoke, mitigating the ‘chimney effect’ that led to such loss of life. In addition, an alarm system in the train or
tunnel would also have improved the response to the blaze, most notably enabling the attendant on the 160 capacity train to try and fight the fire before hydraulics were lost.
Risk assessments The Kaprun fire stemmed most clearly from a lack of appreciation of risk. The train had been approved, met local standards and was not deemed to be a risk, but had any number of risk factors that should have been picked up and addressed. Most notable were the lack of accessible
extinguishers, absence of communication, vulnerability of key systems, design of the tunnel and unsuitability of the fan heaters.
50 MARCH 2019
www.frmjournal.com
forced to make a decision to turn on the pump under significant time pressure – otherwise the entire platform would lose power. Without visually inspecting the pump, they turned it on, causing a pressure overload that quickly led to an explosion. This tore through the platform’s control centre, which was quickly abandoned. No evacuation was ordered as a result, and many personnel sheltered in their fireproof quarters, which were overwhelmed with smoke and eventually fell into the sea. A series of poor decisions from staff who
were concerned about the monetary impact of shutting down the platform meant that the fire was continually fuelled with oil and gas stoking the blaze. Rescuers were largely unable to get near the intense fire and one boat was destroyed by a secondary explosion. A firefighting submersible was initially unable to fight the fire effectively, as its water jet risked injuring evacuating personnel. It was later forced away by the explosions. In total, 61 personnel survived, while 165 lost their lives.
Lessons learned
Decision making A lack of leadership and ingrained fears of shutting down production severely hampered the response to the Piper Alpha fire after it had begun. The enormous economic impact of shutting down and restarting the platform led controllers of the separate oil and gas platforms not to cut the supply to Piper Alpha, which fuelled the fire and explosions. It is thought that, without this supply, the
fire would have burned itself out, avoiding the eventual collapse of the structure and potentially saving dozens of lives. Profit should never come before people’s lives, and procedures should be followed regardless of the impact
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