NEWS Cladding and insulation


The first ‘in-depth’ study of the cladding and insulation used on the tower found that cladding panels were ’55 times more flammable’ than the least flammable options available. PBC Today reported on the study


by researchers at the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan), which uncovered ‘significant differences’ in terms of both flammability and smoke toxicity between the products used on Grenfell Tower and the ‘least combustible products available’. In particular, the polyethylene filled aluminium composite material (ACM) panels used were said to have been ’55 times more flammable’ than the least flammable panels tested in the study. In turn, the smoke released when polyisocyanurate (PIR) insulation was burned was ’15 times more toxic’ than other ‘fire-safe’ insulation products, with only one kilogram of


burning PIR insulation sufficient to fill a room 50m3


in size ‘with an


incapacitating and ultimately lethal mix of carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide gas’. The research also found that the combination of ACM cladding and PIR insulation ‘resulted in the highest flammability and smoke toxicity of products currently available’ and that when used together, the ACM ‘forced rapid ignition of the toxic foam’. The dangers of high pressure laminate (HPL) cladding, a ‘popular alternative’ to ACM, was also highlighted, with this having ‘contributed’ to the deaths at Lakanal House in the fire in 2009. In the study, tests found that HPL had a 25 times greater heat release rate and released 115 times more heat compared to the ‘least flammable’ panels available. Richard Hull, author of the study and professor of chemistry and fire science at UCLan, stated: ‘Our research demonstrates the


need for tighter regulations around flammable and toxic building products, especially when used on towers or buildings with vulnerable occupants, as this could put lives at serious risk. ‘The tests that we have carried


out provide crucial evidence around the large differences in the fire safety of construction products used on UK buildings, and have clear implications for regulators to ensure the fire safety of occupants living in these buildings. Even though the government has recently banned combustible materials from some high-rise buildings in England, regulators need to consider the fire safety of all buildings with combustible façades.’ The research can be found


at https://www.sciencedirect. com/science/article/pii/ S0304389418312275. UCLan also collaborated with the Fire Protection Association in 2018 on a toxicity study in relation to cladding


Welsh government to ‘radically reform or replace’ FSO


A LETTER from the country’s housing and local government minister stated that the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 [FSO] ‘needs to be radically reformed or replaced’. Inside Housing reported on the


text of the letter from minister Julie James to the cross party Equality, Local Government and Communities Committee, which had called in November 2018 for ‘urgent new legislation’ to replace the FSO. It had particularly raised concerns regarding ‘loose regulations’ on fire risk assessments (FRAs), and considers flat front doors ‘not to fall under the regulatory remit of fire services’. Ms James’ letter stated that the


government accepted ‘in principle’ the committee’s recommendations to replace the FSO with laws ‘requiring new standards’ for FRAs, as well as bringing fire doors under fire and rescue services (FRSs) ‘in the current assembly term’. She added: ‘I agree with the committee that the [FSO] needs to be radically


reformed or replaced. The order was not designed for residential buildings and therefore does not address the main risks of fire in such buildings.’ She pointed out however that


reform ‘will require a significant piece, or pieces, of primary legislation’, meaning that it could not be guaranteed before 2021, when the current assembly term finishes, and noted that the Welsh government would ‘continue to work to clarify expectations with regards to fire doors’, accepting ‘in principle’ 13 of the 14 recommendations on high rise fire


safety that the committee had laid out. Those included increasing FRS


involvement during the construction of tall buildings; considering how to ‘encourage’ building owners to retrofit sprinklers; and exploring the ‘feasibility’ of demanding type 4 ‘invasive’ FRAs in all residential high rises. The recommendation rejected was to allow only Local Authority Building Control (LABC) to sign off buildings seven storeys or higher, Ms James stating that neither LABC nor the private approved inspectors system ‘is “bad” per se’


www.frmjournal.com MARCH 2019 9


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