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Above: the Nonpareil was built on the Chesapeake in 1801 but by 1808 had found her way into the Royal Navy, who then ironically used her against the US fleet in the War of 1812. As the fame of these boats spread, initially relations between the USA and France had been cordial, with several Chesapeake builders lured away to a new life in France where they built privateers of similar design. By the turn of the century things were less friendly and this practice ceased. Soon after, in a new round of hostilities between France and England, the Royal Navy captured several of France’s nimble ‘imported’ designs which is no doubt how Nonpareil later ended up on the wrong side in the War of 1812. US topsail schooner Chasseur (top) to leeward of the British warship St Lawrence in a famous action off Havana in 1815. Chasseur was one of 60 or more schooners that freely ran the British ‘paper blockade’ of the Chesapeake during the War of 1812, before heading to Europe under a new captain, Thomas Boyle, to harass British shipping in the English and Irish Channels (where, mocking the British blockade of his home port, her captain declared a ‘blockade’ of the English Channel which was duly posted at Lloyd’s). The St Lawrence action was short and brutal, the British only revealing their formidable armoury when the vessels were within hailing distance. The 15-minute fight ended when US sailors leapt onto the British vessel; the captain of the Chasseur then struck a ‘cartel’ with the surviving St Lawrence crew, sending her and her crew into Havana as his prize. But battle did not always go to the swift: this US brig (left) has just been taken by the British who are in the process of putting a crew aboard


could easily end up losing their investment entirely through capture or loss at sea. Crews could return with little to show for their time and hardships if unable to run the blockade, successfully capture shipping or, at worst, to weather a storm at sea. But more often than not the privateers


on their cruises would send in captures to be sold or ransomed at a breathtaking profit. The entire cost of building and out- fitting a Baltimore Clipper could be redeemed from a single successful voyage. Fortunes were made, lost and made again. Much of the city of Baltimore’s mercantile heritage that exists today had its roots in the bounty from privateering. The usual arrangement was that the


shipowners and investors would take half of the profits and the officers and crew would share the other half. There are well- recorded eye-opening examples of the


proceeds from a single engagement… and these figures are expressed in original 1812 dollars: l Ship Euphrates taken by Rossie, $48,121 l Ship Princess taken by Kemp, $32,777 l Ship Henry taken by Comet, $37,942 In all over 1,600 vessels were taken by


Baltimore vessels throughout a war that lasted less than three years. In that period a successful owner’s profit could easily exceed $200,000 – a staggering sum in today’s money. Most famously, Chasseur captain Thomas Boyle is recorded as earn- ing a similar sum during a single voyage. Engagements with opponents tended to


be sharp and brief with the goal towards minimising damage if at all possible, typi- cally aiming high for the more easily repaired sails and rigging. Loss of life was generally surprisingly light considering the


privateers’ low freeboard and exposed decks. Most cargo ships were armed, like the British warships often outgunning the privateers, but again the motivation of the attackers weighed heavily in their favour. Just as they would against a much more


dangerous enemy more than 100 years later, the British soon began to convoy their shipping with powerful escorts. In response the privateers learned to work together in an effort to divide and distract. A favourite tactic was to dog a convoy,


taking any ship that fell behind or, better yet, to leeward. The escort, often a power- ful and fast large frigate of three or four times the size and arms of the privateer, would give chase. The schooner would be hard pressed to outrun a typical frigate downwind, especially in heavy weather, but as long as everything held together she could lure the aggressor to leeward,


SEAHORSE 53





UNITED STATES MUSEUM OF SCIENCE


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