Feature: Military/defence


used to support or provide holdover when GNSS is disrupted. In general, there is no single alternative technology that offers the unobstructed capability of GNSS at anything close to the cost or size of a GNSS receiver. Te choice of complementary technologies is highly application- dependent, for example, ship vs aircraſt vs emergency responder, since each scenario determines which sensing modalities are viable, what accuracy is required, and the timescale over which GNSS holdover must be maintained. Common technologies considered


for positioning and navigation holdover include inertial navigation systems, vision-based navigation, Doppler radar and radar terrain-reference navigation (for aircraſt), coastal radar map-matching and Doppler sonar (for ships), and terrestrial radio sources such as eLoran, R-mode and opportunistic use of cellular and broadcast signals. Research is also ongoing into more novel methods like magnetic anomaly navigation. For precise time holdover, atomic clocks and terrestrial radio sources are the primary alternatives. Te selection and combination of these technologies involves a trade-off between size, weight, power, cost, performance, complexity and reliability. By continuously assessing GNSS signal


integrity, comparing it against multiple, diverse data sources, such approaches provide early warning of jamming, spoofing and other anomalies before they escalate into operational or safety-critical failures. When GNSS disruption occurs, the ability to draw on a range of other data sources from complementary technologies provides resilience and the ability to continue operating in the absence of reliable and trustworthy GNSS. Tese approaches are already


strengthening the ability of global armed forces to monitor, secure and protect national airspace and critical PNT infrastructure during major international events. By enhancing situational awareness, they enable faster anomaly detection, more accurate threat assessment and coordinated protective measures across both the physical and cyber domains. If GNSS resilience were not robust, the repercussions could be severe. Disruption


to timing and navigation signals can affect everything from aircraſt routing and air traffic control coordination to military communications, surveillance systems and emergency response operations. In a worst-case scenario, compromised GNSS could create confusion in crowded airspace, delay critical decision making, or increase the risk of misidentifying threats during already heightened security conditions. In such circumstances, established


protocols and emergency response procedures would be activated immediately. Armed forces and aviation authorities would shiſt to contingency navigation and timing systems, such as inertial navigation, terrestrial-based backups, or alternative secure PNT sources. Airspace restrictions could be rapidly enforced, with flights re-routed or grounded. Simultaneously, cyber and electronic warfare teams would work to identify the source of interference, assess whether it is accidental or hostile, and use appropriate countermeasures to contain the threat. Tis coordinated response, spanning


defence, aviation and cybersecurity stakeholders, is essential to maintaining operational continuity, protecting civilian safety and ensuring that major international events remain secure even in the face of sophisticated GNSS disruption attempts.


Modern times call for modern measures Governments are now actively modelling and stress-testing the economic consequences of GNSS outages, recognising the sheer scale of the risk. Te UK government, for example, has estimated that a nationwide GNSS disruption lasting just 24 hours would cost the economy over £1.4bn, with similar, or even greater impacts likely across other highly digitised nations. What makes this risk even more


urgent is the changing nature of warfare and global security. Defence spending is rising sharply worldwide, not solely because of traditional military threats, but because conflict has evolved into a


far more complex arena. Modern warfare is increasingly fought through electronic disruption, cyber interference and space- based vulnerabilities rather than the trench-style confrontations of the past. GNSS has become a strategic target in this new landscape: jamming, spoofing and signal denial are now recognised tools of hybrid warfare, capable of undermining both civilian stability and military readiness without a single shot being fired. Tis shiſt is driving significant


investment into resilience measures, as nations seek to reduce dependence on any single source of PNT. Te future will likely see a layered approach to PNT security, combining alternative satellite systems, terrestrial backups, inertial navigation and advanced monitoring technologies that can detect anomalies in real time. Overcoming the threat will depend not only on technical innovation, but on coordinated defence strategies that treat GNSS resilience as a core pillar of national security.


Different approaches? Ultimately, as reliance on GNSS continues to deepen, ensuring its protection will remain a defining challenge of modern security and economic stability. So, is GNSS resilience a universal priority, or does each country approach it differently? In practice, while the vulnerability is


shared globally, national responses vary: some invest heavily in sovereign navigation systems or independent backups, whilst others rely on alliances and shared infrastructure. But with the interconnected nature of global transport, finance and communications means that GNSS disruption is rarely confined by borders. Resilience, therefore, is increasingly becoming a collective imperative, one where cooperation, standards and shared situational awareness may prove just as important as national capability. Yet, despite growing awareness and


debate, significant vulnerabilities remain. As reliance on satellite-derived PNT continues to deepen, the question is no longer whether GNSS disruption will occur, but how societies can build resilience against it.


www.electronicsworld.co.uk May 2026 29


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