Feature: Military/defence


Securing GNSS resilience in modern times


By Professor Aled Catherall, Chief Technology Officer, Plextek H


igh-profile global gatherings such as the recent World Economic Forum in Austria bring renewed scrutiny to our collective dependence


on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). Tis dependence underpins everything from aviation safety and emergency response, to communications, finance and energy infrastructure. Yet, the degradation of GNSS is far easier to achieve than many assume, with potentially severe consequences. Whilst deliberate GNSS jamming is


illegal, disruption can arise from a broad range of sources. Tese include malicious interference, as well as natural phenomena like solar flares, or technical anomalies within satellite constellations – problems which are on the rise. According to IATA, GNSS interference is impacting over 5% of commercial flights within Europe, with a 220% increase in signal loss events between


28 May 2026 www.electronicsworld.co.uk


2021 and 2024. Recent incidents, such as the jamming that affected European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen’s, aircraſt, highlight the very real risks of malicious attacks. However, although GNSS is widely


recognised for its role in positioning and navigation, its equally critical function in delivering precise timing is oſten overlooked. Sub-microsecond timing accuracy is essential for modern applications, enabling synchronised power grids, resilient broadcast and cellular networks, accurate financial trade time-stamping and reliable industrial automation. And, systems that rely exclusively on GNSS for timing are increasingly vulnerable to disruption, whether through accidental outages or deliberate interference.


Silent weapon in hybrid conflict Tere are two broad approaches to mitigating GNSS disruption: increasing


the resilience of GNSS reception and employing alternative complementary sensors. Strategies to increase GNSS resilience


include multi-band, multi-constellation receivers that use and compare signals from multiple GNSS constellations (GPS, Galileo, BeiDou and GLONASS) and, within each, multiple frequency bands (GPS L1, L2, L5, etc.). Tis enhances resilience by enabling cross-referencing across diverse signals and making it significantly more difficult for an adversary to deny all of them simultaneously. In addition, controlled reception pattern antennas can be used to suppress signals arriving from the direction of a jamming source, providing an additional layer of protection. Still, whilst hardening GNSS reception


is valuable, it is insufficient against more sophisticated or determined adversaries. A range of complementary positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) sources is


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