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Column: Silicon systems design


Figure 2: Not all AI verification is equal


This distinction also changes human


review. Engineers may spend less time manually launching tools, moving information between environments and searching through large log sets. More engineering effort may shift toward defining objectives, controlling assumptions, reviewing evidence, and deciding whether the residual risk is acceptable. The engineer therefore becomes less


of a workflow operator and more of an authority over intent, evidence and acceptance.


AlpinumDV provides one example of


this approach, combining AI-assisted verification activity with structured verification artefacts, controlled execution and reviewable evidence, whilst maintaining traceability between engineering intent, generated assets and tool results.


Avoiding circular verification One of the most important risks is circular verification. Suppose the same AI system interprets a requirement, generates an assertion, decides which test should exercise it and then judges whether the resulting evidence is sufficient. The workflow may look complete while all four steps share the same misunderstanding. Using a second agent doesn’t


automatically remove this problem if both agents rely on the same model, retrieved context or hidden assumptions. The strongest workflows deliberately introduce independent evidence. That may include deterministic or independently executed tools, golden reference models, separately authored properties, specification- linked acceptance criteria, differential checking, human review or multiple verification methods addressing the same risk from different directions.


14 October 2026 www.electronicsworld.co.uk The objective is not to prevent an


agent from iterating. Iteration is one of its strengths. The objective is to ensure each iteration is constrained by evidence; the agent can’t simply redefine its answer to support its previous answer. Assurance strengthens as a


workflow moves from model self- critique to executable external checks, independent engineering verification, and requirements-linked evidence interpreted through engineering judgement.


Measure evidence, not agent activity Agentic workflows can produce impressive volumes of activity: generated tests, assertions, tool calls, summaries and proposed fixes. Tese are poor success metrics on their own. Verification teams should instead


measure false acceptance, requirements- to-evidence traceability, reproducibility, review effort, confirmed defect discovery, time to validated root cause and how oſten an agent correctly escalates uncertainty rather than forcing a conclusion. A useful agent is not one that always


produces an answer. It is one that can recognise when the available evidence is insufficient.


From self-verifying AI to defensible engineering The direction of travel is clear. EDA agents are becoming capable of longer and increasingly autonomous engineering workflows. Continuous validation against engineering tools is an important step towards making that autonomy useful. However, “self-verifying” should not


mean that an AI system is allowed to define its own truth. The strongest architecture is one in which agents can plan, act, investigate and retry, while independent tools and controlled engineering artefacts continuously test their assumptions. Every important conclusion should retain its provenance: what requirement triggered the action, what data and revision were used, which tool produced the result, what assumptions applied and who accepted the evidence. AI agents may eventually execute


substantial parts of a verification workflow without continuous human intervention. Trust will not come from autonomy itself. It will come from an evidence chain strong enough that an engineer can understand, reproduce and defend the result.


This column continues in next month’s edition of Electronics World


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