search.noResults

search.searching

saml.title
dataCollection.invalidEmail
note.createNoteMessage

search.noResults

search.searching

orderForm.title

orderForm.productCode
orderForm.description
orderForm.quantity
orderForm.itemPrice
orderForm.price
orderForm.totalPrice
orderForm.deliveryDetails.billingAddress
orderForm.deliveryDetails.deliveryAddress
orderForm.noItems
MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATIONS


JOHN ANGUS D. HILDRETH ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR


Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management


Cornell SC Johnson College of Business Cornell University


When Your Friend is My Friend: How Loyalty Prompts Support for Indirect Ties in Moral Dilemmas Organization Science, 36, 2, March-April 2025 LINK TO PAPER


Co-authors • John Angus D. Hildreth


Associate Professor, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University


• Zachariah Berry, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles CA


Summary How are some criminals able to get away with wrongdoing for months or even


years? Here, the authors consider the role of loyalty in facilitating networks of support for wrongdoers, examining whether the obligations of loyalty to direct ties (here, brokers) transfer through individuals’ social networks to their indi- rect ties, prompting them to support those indirect ties in moral dilemmas. In- tegrating research on brokering, loyalty, relational identity, and social norms, Hildreth and Berry propose that loyalty to a broker will prompt an individual to support an indirect tie accused of wrongdoing; loyalty activates one’s rela- tional identity with the broker, so the individual perceives the broker’s request as falling within the bounds of their loyalty-based obligations to the broker.


Specifically, these norms reveal to the actor their benevolence-based trust in the broker, their value alignment with the broker, and relational concerns for not granting the broker’s request. Te authors further demonstrate how a broker’s history of creating divisions between people moderates how the actor sees the broker and reduces their willingness to grant the request. Across 11 preregistered studies (n = 2,249)—10 experiments and a field study—they found support for their hypotheses: the obligations of loyalty to brokers did indeed transfer to indirect ties accused of wrongdoing, regardless of the type of wrongdoing or strength of evidence presented against the accused.


CONTENTS TO MAIN


| RESEARCH WITH IMPACT: CORNELL SC JOHNSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS • 2025 EDITION


27


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96  |  Page 97  |  Page 98  |  Page 99  |  Page 100