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FINANCE


From Market Making to Matchmaking: Does Bank Regulation Harm Market Liquidity?


GIDEON SAAR PROFESSOR OF FINANCE


DR. PHILIP AND ROSALYN BARON PROFESSOR OF MANAGEMENT


Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management


Cornell SC Johnson College of Business Cornell University


Te Review of Financial Studies, 36, 2, February 2023 LINK TO PAPER


Co-authors • Gideon Saar


Professor of Finance, Dr. Philip and Rosalyn Baron Professor of


Management, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University


• Jian Sun, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University • Ron Yang, Stanford University Graduate School of Business • Haoxiang Zhu, MIT Sloan School of Management and NBER


Summary Te aftermath of the financial crisis saw several regulatory initiatives designed


to curtail risk-taking by banks. In part, these initiatives reflected a widespread belief in banking regulatory circles that the precrisis price of immediacy did not adequately incorporate the costs required to ensure that market makers are supported by sufficient capital and do not become a source of illiquidity contagion. Some market observers have portrayed these regulatory initiatives as a trade-off: Reduced market liquidity during normal times in exchange for enhanced market resilience during stressful periods.


Te authors show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in over-the-counter (OTC) markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market-making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market-making costs change the market struc- ture by intensifying competitive pressure from nonbank dealers and incentiv- izing bank dealers to shift their business activities toward matchmaking. Tus, postcrisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing costly bank balance sheets with a more efficient form of financial intermediation.


TO IMPACT CONTENTS


RESEARCH WITH IMPACT: CORNELL SC JOHNSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS • 2023 EDITION


35


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