Transport & logistics
of Estonian and Latvian companies recently attracted interest to sell UAVs to an unnamed Nato ally.
Into the woods
If you want to panic a politician or officer on Europe’s eastern fringe, you could do worse than whisper three words into their ear: ‘little green men’. That might sound distinctly unthreatening – or even extraterrestrial – but these people and all they represent have already spread chaos in one European country and could yet hurt many more. In 2014, wearing unmarked military uniforms, with masks covering their faces and armed with Russian guns, these soldiers quickly occupied key installations in Crimea, effectively returning the peninsula to Moscow after 20 years as part of Ukraine. Yet because these men weren’t wearing Russian insignia, Vladimir Putin could throw up his hands in mock confusion – even as he sent others to join the fray.
Similar dangers exist wherever you find a sizable Russian minority. Estonia, for example, hosts over 300,000 ethnic Russians – many of whom still haven’t taken up citizenship and feel badly treated by the Baltic majority. To put it another way: better guns and faster missiles are all well and good, but what does collaboration between Nato’s eastern and western flanks actually look like on the ground? And how are the allies preparing for unfriendly arrivals from the east, either of the little green man variety or formal invaders? Kalniš, in answering, is blunt. Russian aggression, he says, is his army’s main priority. “Together with our allies, we monitor what’s happening in our neighbours 24/7.” Bartoszek agrees, reeling off a list of joint initiatives to improve combat readiness. Notable here is the Nato Force Integration Unit in the northern Polish town of Bydgoszcz, whose 40 personnel, together with similar bases across Eastern Europe, are busy detailing transport routes and supply lines in the event of a foreign assault. Clearly, there’s plenty to do before the guns are fired in anger. For one thing, Dyka describes how armies are moving weapons caches closer to combat units, as well as redeveloping bases inherited from the Soviet Union. Logistical training is another piece of the puzzle. Though the pandemic has put paid to the most ambitious schemes, June 2020 still saw major manoeuvres in Poland and the Baltic Sea by 19 Nato armies, including the US, the UK and France. Among other things, the training encompassed river crossings and airborne assaults. Bartoszek emphasises that the aim of these exercises is to stretch supply lines and get quartermasters used to genuine operational conditions. “We’re exercising our combat elements out of training areas, with organic logistics, as close to real environments as possible.”
And what if a long-feared Russian invasion really does come, either through Belarus or directly into the Baltics? Here both Kalniš and Bartoszek are reluctant
to divulge operational secrets, but troop movements may shed some light. Nato recently expanded its so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in Eastern Europe, expanding it to four battalion-size battlegroups. That’s nowhere near enough to block a sustained attack – especially, says Dyka, given the region’s lack of natural obstacles. The idea, then, is probably to use these battlegroups as a stopgap, holding the fort until a proper Nato army can muster in the west. If Nato artillery can hamper Russian bases in Kaliningrad – a German enclave between Poland and Lithuania until 1945 – all the better. Dyka even suggests that, instead of pitched battles and desperate sieges, it might make sense for the EFP to borrow the partisan tactics of old. “All three Baltic States are building their militaries with a heavy – sometimes emotional – focus on the lessons learned from the Forest Brothers,” he says. “By default, they don’t tie their defence to urban areas, and the value of these symbols is not as highly appreciated as in other states.” Estonia, for its part, is taking this principle even further. Rather than defending physical territory, Tallinn plans to take the entire state online in the event of a Russian invasion, helping citizens stay in touch with their leaders remotely even as their streets and towns are under foreign occupation.
$760m
Estonia’s military budget in 2021.
Defense News $4.75bn
The value of the arms deal that saw Poland purchase state-of-the-art Patriot missiles from the US, among other things.
BBC News
“By default, [the Baltic states] don’t tie their defence to urban areas.”
Lukáš Dyka A united Europe?
As he entered the White House earlier this year, President Biden proclaimed that “America is back”. It’s easy to see what he means, especially after the unorthodox foreign policy of his predecessor. Even so, between the rise of China and the constant threat of Islamic terrorism, you have to wonder if the new president is really as committed to the future of Nato as his Cold War forebears. Kalniš – perhaps unsurprisingly given his country’s geopolitical position – is quick to dismiss the suggestion. For Latvia, he says, there can only be one military partner: Nato. Bartoszek is more ambiguous. Though he highlights the many logistical and military benefits of Nato, he suggests that the European Union might play a role in defence too. “In my opinion, Nato and the EU should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security.” Certainly, Poland is working hard to build partnerships outside of purely Nato structures. All the same, with a permanent US military presence in Poland announced in July 2020, the Nato star is unlikely to disappear from the region anytime soon, even as memories of older struggles continue to warn and inspire. ●
Defence & Security Systems International /
www.defence-and-security.com 35
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